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ABSTRACT 
 
STUDIES ON THE EFFECTS OF SYMPATHY AND RELIGIOUS EDUCATIONON 
INCOMEREDISTRIBUTION PREFERENCES,CHARITABLE DONATIONS, AND 
LAW-ABIDING BEHAVIOR 
 
By 
 
ROBERTA DA SILVA CALVET 
 
August, 2011 
 
 
Committee Chair:   Dr. James R. Alm 
Major Department:   Economics 
 
The purpose of this dissertation is to identify the impact of moral emotions 
(sympathy and empathy) and religious education on individual behavior. This dissertation 
is divided into three main chapters. The first chapter examines the effect of sympathy and 
empathy on tax compliance. We run a series of experiments in which we employ methods 
such as priming, the Davis Empathic Concern scale, and questions about frequency of 
prosocial behaviors in the past year in order to promote and to identify empathy and 
sympathy in subjects. We observe the subjects’ decisions in a series of one-shot tax 
compliance game presented at once and with no immediate feedback. Our results suggest 
that the presence and/or the promotion of sympathy in most cases encourage tax 
compliance. The second chapter takes into consideration religious schooling as a way of 
helping the development of religiosity or morality on individuals. Our intent is to 
investigate the effect of religious education on charitable donations in adulthood. Our 
empirical analysis is based on data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics dataset. 
Our estimation results indicate that there is a positive effect of religious education on 
donations to secular and religious organizations. The third chapter explores the 
 
 
xi 
 
hypothesis that sympathetic individuals are more likely to support income redistribution 
because they believe that the poor may benefit from this policy. We use data from the 
General Social Survey to estimate support for income distribution.  Our results suggest 
that some measures of sympathy have a positive effect on support for redistribution.  
Across all three main chapters, we find that sympathy has mostly small and 
positive effects on the types of behavior examined in this dissertation, although we are 
not able to determine the impact of religious education on charitable donations. Despite 
the sometimes weak results of this research caused by the limitations of the available data 
and the complexity of the issues studied, we believe that the development of these moral 
emotions is likely to generate benefits to society.  
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INTRODUCTION 
Human beings have a system of personal norms in their consciousness giving 
them ability to distinguish in many cases between the right and wrong behaviors for a 
given course of action. This system is called morality. Economists are recognizing more 
and more that an individual’s morality tends to influence an individual’s decisions. For 
example, there are some individuals who return anonymously large amounts of money 
lost by a stranger and others who spend more to buy green products. Even though there 
could be other reasons motivating these behaviors, morality may be important in the 
process of decision making for those behaviors.     
The purpose of this dissertation is to identify the impact of morality on individual 
behavior. We acknowledge that morality is a complex issue, and we are not able to cover 
all of its aspects. Instead, we focus on three factors related to morality: empathy, 
sympathy, and religious education. ―Empathy‖ is an affective state of ―putting yourself in 
someone else’s shoes,‖ identifying what the other person is feeling and responding to it. 
It can be to feel the same or a similar emotion as the other person. ―Sympathy‖ is 
considered an emotional response of sorrow or concern for another’s wellbeing caused by 
the other’s emotional state, a response that is not identical to the other’s emotion. These 
two moral emotions, empathy and sympathy, are believed to motivate moral behavior and 
to play a role in moral character according to psychology literature (Eisenberg, 2000; 
Hoffman, 1998). In addition, religious education may help to develop these moral 
emotions, and may influence positively moral character regardless of the religious beliefs 
held.  
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This dissertation is divided into three main chapters. These chapters analyze the 
effects of the moral emotions of sympathy and empathy on tax compliance behavior, their 
effects on preferences for income redistribution, and the relationship between religious 
education and charitable donations. 
The first chapter examines the effect of sympathy and empathy on tax 
compliance. We run a series of experiments in which we employ methods such as 
priming, the Davis Empathic Concern scale, and questions about frequency of prosocial 
behaviors in the past year in order to promote and to identify empathy and sympathy on 
subjects. We observe the subjects’ decisions in a series of one-shot tax compliance game 
presented at once and with no immediate feedback. Our results suggest that the presence 
and/or the promotion of sympathy in most cases encourage tax compliance. We also 
investigate the priming effect of eliciting empathy on tax compliance. According to our 
results, priming empathy has a positive impact on tax compliance under some 
circumstances (e.g., if the individual is not Protestant, not a volunteer, or belongs to the 
group of donors who have given money to the homeless in the past year). These results 
reinforce the inclusion of noneconomic factors in the analysis of tax compliance 
behavior, and, more broadly, they support the creation of a new education policy focusing 
on the development of these types of moral emotions. 
The second chapter takes into consideration religious schooling as a way of 
helping the development of religiosity or morality on individuals. Some studies on 
charitable giving show evidence that religious individuals are more likely to donate more 
time and money compared to a nonreligious group (Brooks, 2004; Wuthnow, 1991) when 
religiosity is measured based on religious beliefs and church attendance. As Hand (2004) 
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states, however, religious teachings can provide moral education to children regardless of 
religious beliefs they may hold. Our intent is to investigate the effect of religious 
education on charitable donations in adulthood, using data from the publicly available 
Panel Study of Income Dynamics.   Our estimation results indicate that there is a positive 
effect of religious education on donations to secular and religious organizations. We also 
find that attending Catholic schools is more likely to increase secular donations, while 
attending other religious schools tends to raise religious donations. Another important 
result is that individuals with religious education are more sensitive to the price of giving, 
thus income tax policies can have an impact on their giving behavior.  Unfortunately, 
these estimation results are unable to control for any potential selection bias that may be 
present in our model. Even so, this chapter provides some evidence to support a new 
policy to increase voluntary contributions based on moral education. 
Sympathy can influence individuals to help other people in distress as well as to 
inhibit behavior that could hurt others since sympathy implies caring about another 
person’s welfare. The third chapter explores the hypothesis that sympathetic individuals 
are more likely to support income redistribution because they believe that the poor may 
benefit from this policy. In this chapter, we acknowledge that there is a problem of self-
selection (since there could be intrinsic values or characteristics that are related to more 
sympathy and to more support for income redistribution) and that we are not able to 
correct this problem due to limitations of the dataset and the complexity of the issue. We 
use data from the General Social Survey to estimate support for income redistribution, 
using as measures of sympathy: the Davis Empathic Concern Scale (Davis, 1980); the 
importance that they give to personally assisting someone in need; the frequency with 
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which they feel a selfless caring for others; and some prosocial behaviors as proxies for 
sympathy. We observe that some measures of sympathy have a positive effect on support 
for redistribution.  As with our estimation results in Chapter two, we are unable to control 
for any potential selection bias that may exist.  Given our restricted analysis, we cannot 
definitively support the importance of including this noneconomic factor in the analysis 
of redistribution preferences.  
We conclude that promoting empathy does not seem to affect tax compliance 
behavior overall. One possible reason for this outcome is that the method used in our 
experiment may not be effective in changing taxpayers’ attitudes.  Another factor may be 
that our priming method may affect attitudes but that the change in attitudes is too small.  
Finally, these attitudes may not be related to compliance behavior. With respect to 
sympathy, there are inconsistent results for the effect of this moral emotion on tax 
compliance and on income redistribution. These results may occur because our sympathy 
measures may be imperfect proxies for this moral emotion, although it is difficult to 
identify which sympathy measure is not adequate. Religious education seems to be 
positively related to money and time donations. Nevertheless, perhaps due to our inability 
to address the potential selection issue, the effect of religious education could not be 
separated from other effects.  
In sum, across all three main chapters we find that sympathy has mostly small and 
positive effects on the types of behavior examined in this dissertation. We are not able, 
however, to determine the impact of religious education on charitable donations. Despite 
the sometimes weak results of this research caused by the limitations of the available data 
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and the complexity of the issues studied, we believe that the development of these moral 
emotions is likely to generate benefits to society. 
 
  
6 
 
 
ESSAY 1: THE ROLE OF EMPATHY AND SYMPATHY IN TAX 
COMPLIANCE: AN EXPERIMENTAL INVESTIGATION 
Introduction 
One intriguing issue about tax compliance is why there seems to be so much 
compliance. Even though there are very strong incentives to evade in most countries due 
to low probabilities of audit and small penalties, taxpayer compliance is higher than 
standard economic theory predicts (Webley et al., 1991; Alm, McClelland & Schulze, 
1992; Alm, Sanchez & De Juan, 1995). The standard economic model of tax compliance 
developed by Allingham and Sandmo (1972) does not seem to provide an answer for this 
high rate of honesty since the model suggests that self-interested individuals would 
choose to evade when the probability of audit and the fine rate are small.  
Some researchers have given noneconomic arguments for this compliance 
behavior. One is related to the fact that individuals tend to overestimate the probability of 
being detected and the penalty amount. Indeed, there is some evidence in experiments 
that some individuals perceive probabilities higher than they actually are (Alm, 
McClelland & Schulze, 1992). Another important noneconomic explanation is tax 
morale. Tax morale is usually defined as ―an individual’s intrinsic willingness to pay 
taxes‖ (Alm & Torgler, 2006, p. 224). Feld and Frey (2007) describe a more complex 
meaning for tax morale, as part of a psychological contract between taxpayers and the 
government. In their words, the core of tax morale consists of ―loyalties and emotional 
ties that go well beyond transaction exchanges‖ (p. 103) between taxpayers and the 
government, and hence positively influence tax compliance. 
Another important issue is that tax morale and tax compliance seem to be affected 
by morality. As Alm and Torgler (2011) argue, it is crucial to consider ethical aspects of 
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individuals in order to understand tax compliance. There are many ways of incorporating 
ethics or morality in a tax compliance decision. For example, Gordon (1989) adds an 
individual’s ―honesty characteristic‖ which acts as a private psychic cost and which 
affects evasion negatively; however, some small evaders belonging to the honest group 
may evade more if tax rates increase. Erard and Feinstein (1994) offer a model with one’s 
moral sentiments of guilt and shame when evasion happens. They find that, when they 
use their more realistically constrained models, the effects of guilt and shame diminish 
the extent of tax evasion.  
Guilt is the most common moral emotion used in research, and is always 
considered a psychic cost in the mathematical formulations. Indeed, if an individual 
evades taxes, she may feel guilty for betraying the psychological tax contract –assuming 
she values tax morale –or for free-riding on public services. Nevertheless, this emotion 
may be a result of not behaving according to one’s own ideal behavior. In other words, an 
individual may have an ideal behavior that she praises, and, when her actual behavior 
deviates from this ideal, she feels guilty. In our analysis, we take into account this 
presence of an ideal behavior influencing decision making, more specifically tax 
compliance decisions.     
According to Akerlof and Kranton (2000), one’s ideal behavior is associated with 
the social category to which an individual belongs.
1
 Individuals in different social 
categories ―should‖ behave differently because they follow mostly different norms or 
prescriptions in order to preserve their self-image or identity. For instance, using gender 
as a social category, individuals are classified as either a ―man‖ or a ―woman.‖ A simple 
                                                             
1 Our definition of ―ideal behavior‖ is the same as Akerlof and Kranton (2010): ―exemplary characteristics 
and behavior associated with a social category‖ (p. 11). 
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example of behavior is to wear a dress. Since a dress is a sign of femininity, women 
wearing dresses are happy for doing it; however, men in dresses may feel discomfort or 
anxiety for violating the norm of masculinity. Hence, men have an incentive to choose 
actions that are in accordance with their ideal behavior based on their identity. 
In this chapter, we use the idea of a moral identity framework in order to 
determine its effects on tax compliance. We separate individuals into two groups: moral 
and amoral. As suggested by Alm and Torgler (2011), we view a moral individual as 
someone who considers paying taxes as the ethical norm.
2
 If she behaves differently, then 
she may incur a psychic cost. Moreover, she may feel pleased if there is full compliance 
for doing ―the right thing.‖ On the other hand, an amoral individual has an ideal behavior 
that may not be to comply fully with taxes. As stated in the case of a moral individual, an 
amoral individual may feel happy (anxious) if she follows (does not follow) her 
prescribed behavior.    
We acknowledge that morality is a complex issue, and that we do not intend to 
cover all of its aspects. Instead, we focus on two moral emotions that have not been 
explored in Economics: sympathy and empathy. Many psychologists argue that sympathy 
and empathy motivate moral behavior and play an important part in morality (Eisenberg, 
2000). ―Empathy‖ is an affective state of ―putting yourself in someone else’s shoes,‖ 
identifying what the other person is feeling and responding to it. It can be to feel the same 
or a similar emotion as the other person. ―Sympathy‖ is considered an emotional response 
of sorrow or concern for another’s wellbeing caused by the other’s emotional state, a 
response that is not identical to the other’s emotion. Usually ―altruism,‖ ―empathy‖ and 
                                                             
2 We acknowledge that there are other issues such as satisfaction with the government that we do not 
consider.  
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―sympathy‖ are considered overlapping terms across different disciplines. In economics, 
―altruism‖ is interpreted as a concern for other that would be included in an altruistic 
individual’s utility as other agents’ wellbeing or monetary payoffs. Thus, it is a type of 
preference, indicating that a selfish individual would never act altruistically unless she 
changes her preference type over time. We define ―altruism‖ as any generous behavior 
towards others, unconditional on rewards or punishments, that can be motivated by social 
norms or by moral emotions such as empathy or sympathy.
3
 
Eisenberg and Miller (1987) demonstrate that there seems to be a positive 
relationship between some measurements of empathy and prosocial behavior, defined as 
voluntary behavior that benefits another.
4
 In another study, Miller and Eisenberg (1988) 
also argue that empathic and sympathetic responding are moderately and negatively 
associated with aggressive and antisocial behavior depending on the method used to 
measure empathy. These findings in psychology literature are reasonable if we consider 
that one’s empathy can produce either personal distress, i.e., ―self-oriented feelings such 
as anxiety and worry regarding one’s own welfare‖ (Eisenberg & Miller, 1987, p. 92), or 
sympathy for the other person’s emotional state (Batson & Coke, 1981). In both cases, an 
individual with empathy may be inclined to help another person in distress either because 
she wants to get away as quickly as possible from the uncomfortable situation due to the 
personal distress she is experiencing or because she is concerned about the other’s 
welfare due to the feeling of sympathy. Similarly, by empathizing, an individual may 
choose to not commit an aggressive or an antisocial behavior because it would not cause 
                                                             
3 According to our theory, these moral emotions influence decisions by changing the importance someone 
gives to her moral identity; however, she does not gain utility for feeling empathy or sympathy and her 
utility does not depend on other individuals’ utility or payoffs. Rather, utility depends on her actual 
behavior compared to her morally ideal behavior. 
 
4 Altruistic behavior is a type of prosocial behavior when there is no expectation of personal gains.  
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negative emotional arousal if she is concerned about her own welfare or because she is 
concerned about the other person’s wellbeing.  
In sum, we expect that empathy and sympathy will encourage positive behavior 
and will inhibit negative conduct. More specifically in the context of this chapter (i.e., a 
tax setting), we expect that paying taxes can increase the welfare of others by increasing 
public services or government transfers, whereas evading taxes may have the opposite 
results. Therefore, we expect that individuals influenced by these moral emotions will 
have a higher rate of tax compliance than others.  
More specifically, we include the concepts of sympathy and empathy as tools to 
identify and to increase the importance of an individual’s moral identity. An important 
characteristic of the identity utility model is that preferences can be changed or 
manipulated by modifying identities (or their norms) through advertisement or education, 
for example (Akerlof & Kranton, 2000). We apply this idea to our model, using the same 
definitions of empathy and sympathy presented by Eisenberg and Miller (1987). In this 
chapter, we have different methods to elicit empathy or sympathy. Our goal is to 
investigate whether the presence of these moral emotions has any influence on tax 
compliance. 
For this, we create a theoretical model including a moral self-perception 
component that is affected by those two moral emotions, and we analyze theoretically 
how these influence individual behavior in paying taxes. In order to test the main 
hypothesis from our theory, we then run a series of experiments in which we use methods 
such as priming, the Davis Empathic Concern scale, and questions about the frequency of 
prosocial behaviors in the past year, in order to promote and to identify empathy and 
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sympathy on subjects. All subjects play a tax compliance game that consists of six 
independent one-shot decisions without immediate feedback from other players’ 
responses. We believe that those moral emotions may affect individual behavior in a tax 
setting. 
Theoretical Background 
First, we present the standard expected utility model and its predictions about the 
behavior of taxpayers. Second, we introduce a model that includes sympathy and 
empathy in an individual’s decision making process. In both sections, we separate the 
model analyses into two parts, according to the absence or presence of a public good. 
The Standard Expected Utility Model 
We consider the model created by Yitzhaki (1974), which was based on 
Allingham and Sandmo’s (1972) work. An individual taxpayer receives an income Ii that 
is known to him or her but not to the Tax Authority. The taxpayer chooses an income 
amount to declare to the Tax Authority, Di. He faces a tax rate, t, and a probability of 
being audited, p. If evasion is detected, a fine, f, based on the evaded tax has to be paid. 
The taxpayer chooses Di so as to maximize a von Neumann-Morgernstern utility function 
defined as: 
 (1) 
where  is the total penalty paid when evasion is detected. For convenience, 
we define INC (after-tax income if not caught) and IC (after-tax income if cheating is 
discovered), or: , and . 
The first-order condition from this maximization (1) is given by: 
 (2) 
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Assuming that the utility function is concave, we have as a second-order condition (S) 
that: 
. (3) 
In order to have an interior solution, the marginal expected utility has to be positive when 
the declared income is equal to zero ( ), and negative when the amount declared is 
equal to true income ( ). These conditions are respectively: 
 (4) 
and 
. (5) 
If the conditions (4) and (5) hold, then there is a positive amount of evasion. In 
the first condition, the right-hand side of the inequality is positive and less than one. The 
second condition indicates that evasion will occur when the product of the audit 
probability and the fine rate is less than one. Thus, these conditions indicate some 
required restrictions on the parameters for cheating on taxes.   
The main analysis of this model is to observe the effects of changes of some 
parameters on declared income. We focus on two important ones: the fine rate and the 
probability of getting caught. These effects are given by: 
 (6) 
and 
 (7) 
13 
 
 
These comparative statistics results indicate that the effects of the penalty rate and the 
audit probability on the level of declared income are the same: if either one increases, a 
taxpayer’s amount of income declared to the Tax Authority also increases.  
When we introduce a public good, a taxpayer’s expected utility incorporates the 
amount received from tax payments of all taxpayers. We assume that a taxpayer takes the 
actions of others as given (Cournot-Nash behavior), and that there is only one period 
(thus, no reason for positive or negative reciprocity). Expected utility becomes: 
 + + ) (8) 
where n is the number of members in the group, k is the public good multiplier
5
, and G is 
the part of the public good originating from taxes paid by all other members of the group 
to which individual i belongs. 
With the presence of a public good, the first- and second-order conditions of 
equation (8) become respectively: 
 (9) 
and 
. (10) 
In addition, the required conditions to have an interior solution in a public good case are: 
 (11) 
and 
                                                             
5 The multiplier is a feature regularly used in the analysis of public goods. In the context of taxes, after 
original tax payments are collected, they are summed up,  multiplied by this number, and then returned to 
taxpayers.   
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. (12) 
Therefore, in the conditions (11) and (12), the public good multiplier and the 
number of individuals in the group are important factors affecting a taxpayer’s decision 
on the amount of income declared.  
The effects of changes of the main parameters (the audit probability, the fine rate 
and the number of taxpayers in a group) for our analysis are: 
 (13) 
 (14) 
 
 (15) 
where the denominator S is defined via the modified maximization that includes the 
public good. 
We can observe that the fine rate and the audit probability have a positive effect 
on the declared level of income, which increasing the number of taxpayers in a group 
decreases the amount of declared income. These are important results for our analysis. 
Our Model 
Our theory is based on the idea that every individual has two different 
components to consider in her utility when making a decision about taxes. The first part 
is the concern about her own monetary payoff. The second part is called the ―identity 
utility‖ (Akerlof & Kranton, 2000), which is the gains or losses in utility from 
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conforming or not to her ideal behavior. This ideal behavior is based on the category that 
the individual belongs to: either moral or amoral.    
Our model is a convex combination of the basic model of tax compliance by 
Yitzhaki (1974) and the identity utility by Akerlof and Kranton (2000). We assume that 
these two parts are separable in the utility. The individual is assumed to maximize the 
following function: 
 (16) 
where Ui
T
 is the total utility of individual i, Ui is the utility she gets from her own income, 
Ii represents the level of income, θi is the moral preference coefficient, Di represents the 
declared income and  is the ideal behavior that individual i wants to follow. This ideal 
behavior ( ) is equal to  (i.e., full income) for moral individuals, and less than  for 
amoral individuals.  
The moral identity utility is a function of the difference between what she 
considers her ideal behavior and her actual behavior Di. Thus, if she does less than her 
morally ideal behavior, then her moral identity and her utility are affected negatively. 
This negative effect can be considered the feeling of guilt or frustration (independently of 
tax evasion being detected). On the other hand, if her actual behavior approaches her 
morally ideal behavior, then she may feel happy for doing what she thinks it is right. 
The utility part that is a function of her own income depends on how much she 
declares and whether she is caught or not. In order to analyze how much income she 
reports, we consider the probability of an audit to occur. We calculate the expected utility 
of (16), which is given by: 
 (17) 
16 
 
 
where , and p is the probability of getting caught.  
With respect to the moral identity utility, we assume that a moral individual has 
higher levels of empathy and sympathy since these emotions are related to morality (thus, 
her moral coefficient has a higher value than an amoral individual). In addition, as stated 
earlier, one of the characteristics of the identity utility is that identity can be changed or 
manipulated by a third party. Here, we consider that eliciting empathy can affect one’s 
moral identity by increasing the importance of the moral identity in the utility function 
(i.e., affecting the moral coefficient θi), hence changing an amoral individual’s ideal 
behavior to a moral individual’s level (i.e., fully complying with taxes).  
Therefore, sympathy and empathy are supposed to increase the utility impact of 
morality(θi) at a decreasing rate. Then, the moral coefficient θ is determined by: 
 (18) 
whereεi is the level of empathy and σi represents the degree of sympathy. 
Maximizing equation (17) gives the following first order conditions, the first 
when there is not public good and the second in the presence of a public good: 
 (19) 
 (19’) 
The second-order conditions of equation (17) are given respectively by:  
 (20)        
 (20’) 
These conditions are satisfied since, by assumption: . 
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Now the conditions for an interior solution, considering for brevity only the case 
without public goods, are given by: 
 (21) 
and 
 (22) 
These equations can be rewritten as: 
 (21’) 
and 
 (22’) 
In words, the individual chooses an interior solution if conditions (21’) and (22’) hold. 
Equation (21’) says that she declares more than zero if her moral coefficient is higher 
than the marginal utility of income for declaring zero income. On the other hand, 
equation (22’) states that she declares less than full income if her moral coefficient is 
lower than her marginal utility of income for declaring full income. 
Now we examine how reported income is affected by the level of sympathy and 
empathy. Again, we consider only the case without public goods. The first-order 
condition in equation (19) changes slightly in order to account for the fact that the moral 
coefficient is a function of sympathy and empathy, or: 
 (23) 
Using the implicit function theorem, we have: 
 (24) 
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We know that the denominator, which is the second-order condition reported in equation 
(20), is negative. The numerator is positive because its terms are all positive. Thus,
, meaning that an increase in the degree of empathy leads to an increase in reported 
income. A similar result can be derived for the level of sympathy, by replacing with , 
which is also positive. 
This theoretical framework provides the basis for our experimental tests. 
Specifically, we test the hypothesis that an increase in the level of empathy (or that a 
higher level of sympathy) encourages more tax compliance from individuals. As our 
theory predicts, increasing these moral emotions leads to higher levels of the moral 
coefficient, which in turn will increase compliance.  
Experimental Work 
We use experimental methods to study how these moral emotions affect tax 
compliance behavior. Alm and McKee (1998) state that experiments may help examine 
factors that field data are not able to. Indeed, for our investigation of emotions, we need a 
controlled environment that only experimental procedures are able to offer. In addition, 
we consider the tax compliance decisions of undergraduate students due to their 
availability and their easy access for experimental research centers. The use of 
undergraduate students as subjects in tax compliance experiments is valid since there is 
evidence that their responses are not different from the responses of other types of 
subjects in experiments (Plott, 1987).    
Experimental Design 
The experiment is conducted in four sessions involving different groups of 
subjects. A summary of the sessions can be seen in Table 1. In the two last sessions, we 
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investigate the effect of promoting empathy on tax compliance. One session has a 
priming activity before the tax compliance game with the purpose to elicit empathy on 
participants; another session does not have this preliminary activity in order to serve as a 
control group. In all four sessions, subjects have to complete the Davis Empathic 
Concern Scale and to answer how often they have participated in prosocial behaviors in 
the past 12 months in their questionnaires. The instructions with the questionnaire are 
available in the Appendix A. 
Empathy and Sympathy 
The experiment is designed to promote and identify the moral emotions of 
empathy and sympathy on participants and to observe their behavior towards paying 
income taxes in different scenarios. There are three main methods used to gather their 
information about sympathy and empathy: Davis Empathic Concern Scale (DECS), 
frequency of prosocial behaviors and priming. The Davis Empathic Concern Scale 
measures someone’s ability to feel sympathy. The frequency of prosocial behaviors 
works as a proxy for the measurement of sympathy. In addition, we promote empathy 
with the use of priming. More details are given throughout this section. 
One measure of sympathy is based on the Davis Empathic Concern Scale. All 
participants are asked to respond to the DECS in their questionnaire after all decision 
tasks. The DECS is a subset of the Interpersonal Reactivity Index (IRI) developed by 
Davis (1983). The entire scale has the goal of assessing the empathy of the individual, 
defined as the degree at which the individual puts himself or herself in the position of 
someone who is more ―unfortunate.‖ 
For the purpose of this research, we are primarily interested in evaluating how 
much someone is concerned about other people in need. The subset of the IRI, the Davis 
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Empathic Concern Scale, measures this factor. It evaluates the propensity of an individual 
to experience feelings of sympathy for unfortunate people. This scale consists of seven 
items. For example, one of the items is ―I often have tender, concerned feelings for 
people less fortunate than me.‖  The respondents are asked to specify if these items 
describe them well or not, with values –ranging from 0 (―does not describe me very 
well‖) to 4 (―describes me very well‖). The scale is very simple and has internal and test-
retest reliability (Davis, 1980).
6
 
In the questionnaire, there are also questions about the frequency of prosocial 
behaviors in the past year. Subjects are asked to answer how many times they have 
donated blood, given money or food to a homeless person, given money to charity, and/or 
done volunteer work in the past 12 months. We create one dummy variable for each type 
of prosocial behavior, where one means that the individual has done the activity at least 
once in the past year. These variables can be also considered as an approximation for 
one’s level of sympathy. 
For empathy, we use another technique: ―priming.‖ Many psychologists have 
used different tasks to elicit attitudes or values explicitly or implicitly –i.e., to ―prime.‖ 
According to Bargh and Chartrand (2000, p. 258), ―priming studies are concerned with 
the temporary activation states of an individual’s mental representations and how these 
internal readiness interact with environmental information to produce perceptions, 
evaluations, and even motivations and social behavior.‖ Our purpose is to promote 
empathy in a group of subjects before they face tax compliance decisions. In one session, 
                                                             
6 Internal reliability refers to how consistent a measure is within itself. Usually questions that measure the 
same concept (e.g., empathy) are divided into groups, and asked to the same participant. If the responses 
for these groups of questions provide similar results, then there is internal reliability.  Test-retest reliability 
occurs if the same participant has similar results when she takes the same test again after a period of time.  
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we ask subjects to write in their own words the definition of the Golden Rule after 
reading versions of the same moral rule in six different religions. In another session, for 
comparison, a control group of subjects do not complete the priming task. 
Tax Compliance Game 
In all sessions, the basic game is six independent one-shot tax compliance games 
with different settings of audit probabilities, of penalties and of returns from the tax 
amount paid. The design for this part of the experiment is summarized in Table 2. These 
decisions are presented at the same time and are made without any feedback about other 
participants’ decisions.  
In the tax compliance game, all subjects receive an income of ten dollars. They 
know they are in a group of four and that they all face the same decision. Subjects are 
told that they should pay taxes on their income and that they must decide how much of 
their income they want to declare to a Tax Authority. The instructions indicate that there 
is a possibility of an audit, meaning that their declared incomes could be checked. If they 
are audited (or checked), then they are told that all undeclared taxes will be discovered 
and that they will have to pay taxes on their undeclared income plus a penalty equal to a 
multiple of that value. Whether or not an audit occurs is determined by the draw of a ball 
from a box that contains a total of ten red and white balls. If a red ball is drawn, 
everybody is audited; if a white ball is drawn, there is no audit. The tax rate is the same 
for all decisions: 30 percent. The audit and fine rates vary throughout the session.  
There is also a public fund for most decisions. When there is a public fund, the 
original amount of taxes collected in each group is doubled and called the ―public fund.‖ 
This public fund does not include tax and penalties paid due to failure to comply with 
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taxes. In most cases, the public fund is returned fully to the group, divided equally among 
its members. In one scenario, the public fund is divided equally between the group and a 
set of charities chosen by its members; in this case, each member gets half of the amount 
they would receive if the public fund returned in full to the group. In one setting there is 
no public fund. 
There are several reasons to have a tax compliance game designed as six 
independent one-shot games. First, we want to have information about one’s behavior 
under different values of the main parameters that can affect decisions in a tax setting: 
audit probability, penalty rate, and returns from tax payments. The manner by which the 
game was designed allows us to isolate the separate effect of variations in each 
parameter. Second, by not providing feedback about others’ decisions, there is no chance 
of potentially confounding negative or positive reciprocity effects among players. Third, 
even though there are reasons to have many rounds for tax compliance game such as 
learning through experience, we believe that collecting the same amount of information 
about the effects of those main parameters within subjects could make the experimental 
sessions exhausting for them, and so we limit the number of decisions to six.   
Before their actual decisions are made in the tax compliance game, we require 
that subjects write their decisions and their respective payoffs with and without an audit 
in two practice examples that are similar to the real ones. The purpose of the practice 
examples is to check subjects’ understanding of the task. After they complete the practice 
examples, we distribute the decision sheet containing all of the six scenarios as presented 
in Table 2. During the completion of the practice examples and of the real tasks, each 
participant is able to consult a computer that presents in a protected excel spreadsheet the 
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calculations for each type of decision. In some excel worksheets, there is a cell in which 
they can enter their expectations about how much they think someone else in the group 
would declare. This information is important in order to provide more accurate numbers 
for the returns of the public fund in the decisions in which this fund is available.  
Experimental Procedures 
The experiment is conducted in the Experimental Economics Center (EXCEN) at 
Georgia State University. Over one hundred participants overall are recruited from the 
pool of undergraduate and graduate students at GSU, and they can participate only once.  
No subjects have previously participated in any tax compliance experiments. The group 
is formed by 61 females and 57 African-Americans. In addition, in all sessions, we retain 
an additional participant who volunteers to be a monitor whose function is to verify that 
the experiment is conducted according to the instructions. Each monitor is paid based on 
the average of the highest payoff possible in each session. 
This is a hand-run experiment with computer assistance for calculations. Upon 
arrival at the laboratory, participants are assigned to a computer station. General 
instructions for the experiment are given at the beginning of each session, telling subjects 
the structure of the experiment and the way in which payoffs are determined. Subjects 
know how many parts and how many decisions they will face; however, they are not yet 
aware of the specific nature of the decisions. Only when the instructions for each part are 
distributed do they have access to this information. After the general instructions, the 
instructions for the first part are distributed. Once they complete this part, the instructions 
are collected. Then, the following instructions are distributed and collected after 
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completion. This process goes on until all parts of the experiment, including the 
questionnaire, are done. All subjects have reasonable time to complete each part.  
In all sessions, no communication among the participants is allowed. If the 
subjects have any questions, the experimenter comes to them and answers the question in 
private. If the experimenter believes that the question is one that most of them will 
benefit from, then the explanation is given to the entire group. Also, the experiment 
follows a double-blind procedure; that is, subjects can only be identified by their key 
numbers (only they know that number), and the subject payoffs are distributed through 
the use of mailboxes. Thus, neither the subjects nor the experimenters can associate a 
specific person with her decisions, keeping privacy and anonymity in the course of the 
experiment. At the end of each session, each subject can collect her payoff using her key 
to open her mailbox, inside which is an envelope containing her earnings. 
All decisions in the experiment, excluding the priming activity, are numbered 
successively. The final payoffs are determined by the draw of a numbered ball from a 
cage containing all the numbers of decisions. There are only six balls representing the six 
decisions all subjects face in each session. Participants are paid only for the decision 
randomly chosen. We follow Goeree, Holt and Laury (2002) who argue that paying for 
only one decision stimulates subjects to think more clearly about each individual decision 
and the consequences that each decision may have on their future payoffs compared to 
paying for all decisions. 
In addition to the earnings for the decision selected, participants are paid a $5 
show-up fee, and they receive $1 for completing each of the two examples, $5 for the 
priming activity, and $8 for the questionnaire. They do not know in advance how much 
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they will receive for each of these items. Earnings range between $23.50 and $33, with an 
average payoff of $27.35. The sessions last about two hours, including the time for 
subject payment.   
Experimental Results 
We separate the results into summary statistics showing the effect of sympathy 
and empathy variables on the average individual compliance rates and regression results 
in which those effects are better isolated. 
Summary Statistics 
The summary statistics of all variables are available in Table 3. In Tables 4 and 5, 
we show the average individual compliance rates disaggregated across sessions and 
groups by treatment for each decision because it becomes easier with the disaggregate 
data to observe the effect of the sympathy and empathy variables on compliance rates. 
The individual compliance rate is calculated by dividing the tax reported by the tax owed 
for each subject, and the average compliance rate is calculated as a simple average across 
all subjects within each group. Table 4 presents the average individual compliance rates 
by session. Table 5 shows the average individual compliance rates among different 
sympathy variables: for a high or low Davis Empathic Concern scale value and among 
prosocial behaviors. 
In session S3, subjects receive a priming activity to elicit empathy. As can be seen 
in Table 4, for decisions 2, 3 and 4, subjects of session S3 have a higher average 
individual compliance rate than the other sessions. The difference between the average 
individual compliance rates in session S3 and in the control group (or session S4), are 
statistically significant at 10 percent for two of these decisions (2 and 3) based on a t-test. 
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However, we fail to reject the null hypotheses that the means of these two groups are the 
same in the other decisions.  
Some information used to construct Table 5 is collected in the post-experiment 
questionnaire. For the Davis Empathic Concern Scale, the subjects are divided into two 
groups: the High DECS Score Group is composed of individuals who obtain the median 
(a score of 21) or higher value in the DECS, and the Low DECS Score Group is 
composed of those who have less than 21 points. With respect to prosocial behaviors, 
based on their answers in the survey, the subjects who have donated blood or money to 
charities or homeless people at least once in the past year are grouped as Donors and the 
subjects who had been done volunteer work are grouped as Volunteers while those who 
have not participated in these types of activity are grouped as Nondonors and 
Nonvolunteers, respectively.  
The High DECS Score Group has a higher individual compliance rate than the 
Low DECS Score Group, a difference that is statistically significant at 5 percent level in 
decision 4 based on t-test as can be seen in Table 5. The High DECS Score Group has an 
average compliance rate of 0.58 while the Low DECS Score Group had an average of 0.4. 
In addition, Volunteers seem to be more likely to comply with taxes on average compared 
to Nonvolunteers. In decision 1, the Volunteers have an average of 0.75 and 
Nonvolunteers, 0.61. The difference has statistical significance of 10 percent on a t-test. 
Regression Results 
Econometric results are shown in Table 6 through Table 9. We use Tobit 
estimations in all models since the dependent variable, Individual Compliance Rate, is 
bounded from 0 to 1. Also, we report marginal effects instead of coefficients. We first 
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examine the control variables and their effects on individual compliance rate. Then, we 
focus on the variables of empathy and sympathy.  
Consider regression (1) in Table 6. This regression omits sympathy or empathy 
variables, and is called the basic model from now on. As expected, the audit and the 
penalty rates are positive and statistically significant at 1 percent level. According to our 
results, increasing the audit rate by 100 percent increases the individual compliance rate 
by 30 percent, and increasing the penalty rate by 100 percent increases the individual 
compliance rate by 2 percent.  Being a graduate student (versus being a sophomore) also 
tends to increase the tax compliance rate, by 5 percent at the 5 percent significance level. 
White individuals are more likely to have higher compliance rates. The audit rate has the 
highest economic significance of all the independent variables, thus suggesting that a 
policy change in the probability of being audited is possibly sufficient to increase tax 
compliance. Nevertheless, Alm, McClelland and Schulze (1992) point out that this 
relationship tends to be nonlinear and that the effect of a higher audit rate decreases 
eventually.  
Of most interest are the effects of the empathy and sympathy variables. We 
examine primarily the effects of the empathy variable, Priming, and the sympathy 
variables High DECS Score Group, and the prosocial behaviors (Blood Donor, Giving to 
Homeless, Giving to Charity, and Volunteer) in two settings: without the basic model 
(Table 7) and with the basic model (Table 8) in the regressions. Table 9 shows some 
results with various interaction terms between the sympathy and empathy variables as 
well as a few control variables. In order to make the analysis simpler, we consider each 
table separately. 
28 
 
 
Table 7 shows the marginal effects of sympathy variables when each is the only 
independent variable taken into account when explaining changes in tax compliance. We 
observe that Giving to Homeless and Giving to Charity are not statistically significant in 
this setting. Only being in the High DECS Score Group (at the 10 percent significance 
level), being a Blood Donor (at the 10 percent significance level), or being a Volunteer 
(at 5 percent level) matter in explaining individual tax compliance. The individual 
coefficients on these variables are positive and around 0.02, meaning that in each case 
compliance increases by 2 percent, which is small if compared to the effect of the audit 
rate but similar to the effect of the fine rate on the individual compliance rate. Thus, a 
policy of promoting sympathy could have a similar effect to a policy of increasing the 
fine rate by 100 percent.  
In Table 8, when we include some control variables, the results change to some 
extent. Most sympathy variables are not statistically significant in this setting. The effect 
of Volunteer on Individual Compliance Rate is still positive, about 0.04, and statistically 
significant at the 10 percent level. However, Giving to Charity is now associated with 
greater tax evasion (by 0.02).  These are interesting results. We expect to see sympathy 
variables affecting tax compliance in the same way since they represent the same concept 
in our study. Nevertheless, they seem to have different effects. This indicates that some 
of our variables may not be good proxies for sympathy.  
In sum, sympathy has somewhat variable effects on compliance. The ability to 
feel sympathy and being a Blood Donor or a Volunteer in the past 12 months is positively 
associated with tax compliance. These findings are in accordance with the prediction of 
our theory, which states that more sympathy implies a higher level of reported income. 
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Nevertheless, Giving to Charity increases tax evasion. This result may not be so 
surprising if we separate the prosocial behaviors into two groups by differences in effort 
(or cost) involved in the activity. The group with a higher cost is formed by being a 
volunteer or a blood donor. Because these activities require time and commuting, they 
require a higher disposition to help compared to simply giving money to the homeless or 
to a charity. Also, this higher disposition implies a higher self-control over desires (e.g., 
choosing to spend time on donating blood rather than on the beach), which may lead to a 
higher tendency to obey rules.  
Overall, attempts to promote empathy do not seem to affect tax compliance. In 
Tables 7 and 8, the marginal effect of Priming is not statistically significant. However, 
our theory predicts that empathy increases the level of declared income. Perhaps 
encouraging empathy on individuals by other methods such as reading a compelling story 
involving empathy is more effective than reading a few religious statements about the 
Golden Rule. Another issue is that promoting empathy may need more time to be 
established, thus lectures about empathy for a week or more may be a better alternative 
for priming. Also, there are other possible factors whose effects may overcome the 
effects of empathy, such as aversion to some religions or to religion per se, given that we 
present religious statements in our priming activity. These are meaningful points to 
consider, and we cannot argue that empathy is related to tax compliance based on our 
results.  
Table 9 presents regressions in which we include some interaction terms among 
the empathy and other independent variables. If we include interaction terms between 
religion variables and Priming, as in regression (14), we observe that Priming decreases 
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the compliance rate of Protestants by 20 percent. Although the coefficient of the 
Protestants is not statistically significant, the compliance rate of the Protestants without 
Priming is 4 percent higher than the compliance rate of individuals without religion.  In 
regression (17), if we take into consideration the variable Volunteer, its impact is also 
affected by Priming. If the subject participated in the priming activity, the effect of 
volunteering increases the evasion rate by 7 percent; otherwise, this effect on compliance 
is positive and equal to 9 percent. Priming also influences the effect of another prosocial 
behavior. The presence of Priming increases the compliance rate of blood donors as can 
be observed in regression (15) in Table 9. Although the variables Priming and Blood 
donor are not statistically significant, the interaction term between these two terms is 
significant, at the 5 percent level. Thus, the individuals who have donated blood in the 
past and are primed are more likely to comply with taxes. In the case of giving money or 
food to the homeless at least once in the past year (or regression (16)), if the individual 
participated in the priming activity, then the effect of giving to homeless on tax 
compliance is 2 percent; otherwise, it reduces tax compliance by 9 percent.  
Therefore, Priming, or empathy, has mixed effects on certain groups of 
individuals, and the results are not consistent overall. For blood donors and for 
individuals who have given money to the homeless, promoting empathy increases tax 
compliance. For Protestants and for volunteers, the effect of Priming is the opposite. 
These mixed results may indicate that either the method used in this experiment is not 
effective in changing taxpayers’ attitudes, or the priming activity affect their attitudes but 
the change is too small, or these attitudes are not related to compliance behavior. 
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Composite Indicator of Sympathy 
In this section, we analyze the effect of sympathy on tax compliance by grouping 
the variables of sympathy used in this study: Davis Empathic Concern Scale and the 
measures of prosocial behavior. After analyzing the summary statistics of sympathy 
variables from our dataset, we use one statistical method to create a composite index of 
sympathy: principal components analysis (or factor analysis).  
Summary Statistics of Sympathy Variables 
Table 10 shows the percentage of subjects, divided by sympathy groups, that have 
done one of the prosocial behaviors at least once in the past year. As we can observe in 
this table, those who are considered to have a higher level of sympathy (either because 
they had a higher score in the Davis Empathic Concern Scale or because they have 
engaged in a prosocial activity at least once in the past year) are more likely to participate 
in other prosocial activities. However, it is important to notice that some of those who are 
considered either nondonors in certain prosocial activities or nonvolunteers may engage 
in other prosocial behavior. For instance, 15 of 16 blood donors (94 percent) have 
volunteered in the past year at least once while 53 of 71 subjects who have not donated 
blood (75 percent) have volunteered in the past year. Moreover, those who have 
volunteered are more likely to donate money to the homeless and to a charity. About 81 
percent of volunteers have given money to the homeless, and about 71% have given 
money to a charity. This result seems to contradict the idea that students would choose to 
volunteer more than to donate money because of their lower income levels.  
Also, a lower percentage of nonvolunteers have done these two prosocial 
activities; nevertheless, it corresponds to more than a half of all nonvolunteers. These 
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results indicate that our sympathy variables are relative, but not absolute measures of 
sympathy. Therefore, grouping sympathy variables could lead to a better measure of 
sympathy since it takes into account the possibility of an individual having a higher 
sympathy level in only one or more of our sympathy variables. The next section discusses 
a statistical method regularly used to create a composite index. 
Principal Component Analysis 
This multivariate analysis method examines the underlying relationships for a 
number of variables (example of variables: test scores and questionnaires responses) and 
establishes if the information can be summarized in a smaller set of hypothetical 
variables (Hair, Anderson, Tatham & Black, 1995; Kim & Mueller, 1978). Our goal is to 
create a sympathy index using the sympathy variables we have in our dataset. These 
variables are High DECS Score Group, and the dummy variables of the prosocial 
behaviors: Blood Donor, Giving to Homeless, Giving to Charity, and Volunteer.  
It is important to notice that they all are dummy variables. When there are only 
dummy variables to be considered in the factor analysis, a specific procedure is required. 
Because of the limited information available on this type of procedure, we decide to 
consider the original variables instead. Thus, we use the following variables: DECS Score 
(an ordinal variable varying from 0 to 28) and the frequency of the prosocial behaviors 
mentioned earlier (Blood Donation, Giving to Homeless, Giving to Charity, and 
Volunteering: values represent the number of times that a subject has performed the 
activity in the past year, and they range from 0 to 3). 
The first step is to examine the correlation among these variables shown in Table 
11. As we can observe in this table, the measures of sympathy do not seem to have a very 
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strong correlation among them. It is important to mention, however, that the Barlett test 
of sphericity indicates that the correlations among the sympathy variables in general are 
significant at the 0.01 percent significance level. Also, the measure of sampling adequacy 
is 0.557, which is acceptable according to Hair, Anderson, Tatham and Black (1995).  
 Because of the low correlation coefficients between DECS score and the 
prosocial behavior variables (mostly around 0.1) shown in Table 11, we decide to 
eliminate DECS score from our analysis. Among the other sympathy variables, the 
highest correlation coefficient, 0.33, is between Volunteering and Blood Donation. The 
other high coefficients are Giving to Homeless and Giving to Charity (0.32), and between 
Giving to Charity and Blood Donation (0.28). As we expect, all these relationships are 
positive. Nevertheless, some correlation coefficients indicate a weak negative 
relationship between some sympathy variables. The coefficient between Volunteering and 
Giving to Homeless is about –0.015. This result may indicate that there are other factors 
affecting an individual’s preferences for a specific prosocial behavior.  
One important issue to consider is the difference in the costs of certain prosocial 
behaviors for example. Some activities are considered high-cost prosocial behavior 
because they require some cognitive understanding of other people’s needs and usually 
may elicit a cognitive conflict between values, motives and personal needs and desires 
(e.g. donating blood or volunteering), while low-cost prosocial actions are performed 
without any cognitive reflection or moral considerations (e.g. helping someone pick up 
dropped papers) (Miller, Bernzweig, Eisenberg & Fabes, 1997; Eisenberg, Losoya & 
Guthrie, 1997). Thus, there may be personal traits or other factors affecting the decision 
to choose one prosocial action over another, perhaps based on the costs associated with 
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them. This is an important issue to consider when interpreting the results from the 
principal component analysis that follows.  
The principal component analysis identifies the underlying structure among 
variables (called ―factors‖) and creates a new set of variables based on that. Table 12 
presents the information about four possible factors and their relative explanatory power 
shown by their ―eigenvalues.‖7 A high eigenvalue means that the factor contributes a lot 
to the explanation of variances in the variables, and a low eigenvalue means the opposite. 
The most commonly used method to select the factors to keep in the principal 
components analysis (latent root criterion) is to consider only the factors whose 
eigenvalue is greater than 1.
8
 Based on this criterion and on the eigenvalues shown in 
Table 12, there are two factors that summarize the original set of observed prosocial 
behavior variables: factor1 and factor2.  
In Table 13, it is possible to visualize the ―factor loadings‖ (i.e., correlation 
between the original variables and the ―factors‖). Factor1 has a high correlation 
coefficient with Volunteering and Blood Donation whereas Factor2 is strongly correlated 
to Giving to Homeless and Giving to Charity. This result suggests that we can separate 
the prosocial behaviors into two groups. We decide to separate them based on the cost of 
performing the activity as explained earlier in this section. We believe that volunteering 
and donating blood would require more effort (in terms of time and disposition) than 
giving money to charity or to the homeless. We have factor1 representing the high-cost 
                                                             
7Definitions come from Hair, Anderson, Tatham, and Black (1995): factor-underlying structures, which 
summarize the original set of observed variables; and eigenvalues, or the amount of variance in all the 
variables accounted for by a factor. 
8 It is possible to restrict the number of factors extracted from the principal components analysis. When we 
limit the extraction to only one factor that could group the original variables to one variable of ―sympathy,‖ 
we do not find statistically significant results. Thus, we follow the latent root criterion and it gives some 
significant results. 
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prosocial actions (Volunteering and Blood Donation) and factor2 indicating the low-cost 
prosocial actions (Giving to Homeless and Giving to Charity).  
The effects of factor1 (high-cost) and factor2 (low-cost) on tax compliance can be 
seen in Table 14. The coefficients of these variables are statistically significant in some 
occasions. First, when these variables are the only ones explaining tax compliance, we 
observe that factor1 (or high-cost prosocial behaviors) has a positive effect on tax 
compliance. When other control variables are included, participating in low-cost 
prosocial behaviors (or factor2) decreases tax compliance. In sum, the two types of 
prosocial behaviors seem to be affecting tax compliance in opposite ways. One possible 
explanation for this result may be that individuals involved in high-cost prosocial 
behaviors are more likely to follow rules since they may make more use of self-control as 
when deciding to participate in high-cost prosocial behaviors. However, these mixed 
results reinforce the notion that some of the sympathy variables may not be good proxies 
for this moral emotion.     
Moreover, priming has a positive effect on the individuals participating in low-
cost prosocial behaviors (factor2). As seen in Table 14, the coefficient for factor2 is 
equal to -0.072, meaning that an increase in participation in low-cost prosocial behaviors 
is related to a less tax compliance. This result indicates that some exposure to moral 
instruction may change the inclination to a negative behavior such as tax evasion. 
Nevertheless, priming does not seem to reinforce the positive behavior from the 
participants of high-cost prosocial behavior (factor1) since none of the coefficients are 
statistically significant. Again, this result may indicate that our priming activity does not 
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seem to cause changes in taxpayers’ attitudes, or that this change is too small to affect 
behavior.    
Conclusion 
The portfolio model of tax compliance does not adequately explain why there is 
so much tax compliance even when the rates of detection and penalties are small. Many 
researchers emphasize that there are noneconomic reasons that may influence this 
decision. In this chapter, we investigate the moral aspect of the tax compliance decision 
by considering the roles of two moral emotions in tax compliance: sympathy and 
empathy. In our theoretical model, we observe that, with higher levels of sympathy and 
empathy, the moral preference coefficient increases and tax evasion then decreases. In 
order to test this prediction, we run an experiment with features that allow us to collect 
information about one’s level of sympathy and also with a priming activity that has the 
purpose of eliciting empathy on subjects.  
We consider two types of variables to measure one’s level of sympathy. First, 
from a post-experiment survey, we gather subject responses to a scale used in psychology 
to measure an individual’s level of sympathy, called the Davis Empathic Concern Scale 
(DECS). The scores range from 0 to 28, and we separate the sample into high score and 
low score groups based on the median value, 21. The second group of sympathy variables 
is also based on the subjects’ answers to the questionnaire section on giving or prosocial 
behaviors. These questions are about the frequency that the individual has donated blood, 
given money or food to a homeless person, given money to charity and/or done volunteer 
work in the past year. We separate the sample into donors and nondonors, based on the 
criterion of whether one has done the activity at least once in the past twelve months.  
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With this information, we observe the subjects’ decisions in a series of one-shot 
tax compliance games presented with no immediate feedback. In these decisions, subjects 
had to choose how much income to declare to a tax authority. Based on the results 
generated in our experiment, we argue that in most cases sympathy is associated with 
more tax compliance. The group of individuals with a high DECS score also seems to 
have higher compliance rates. With respect to giving behaviors, depending on the type of 
activity, we observe a positive relationship with tax compliance; that is, those who have 
donated blood or done volunteer work at least once in the past year are less inclined to 
evade taxes than those who have not. Somewhat surprisingly, giving money to a charity 
at least once in the past twelve months tends to increase tax evasion as well as giving 
money or food to a homeless at least once in the past year but only if the individuals who 
have done the latter do not receive any type of moral support as a priming activity.  
We also investigate the effect of using priming, by eliciting empathy, on tax 
compliance. In one of the sessions, subjects have to read a few statements of the Golden 
Rule in different religions and to explain with their words this moral term; in another 
session, another group does not have to perform this activity. According to our results, 
priming has a positive impact on tax compliance if the individual is not Protestant, not a 
volunteer or is a donor who has given money to homeless. These different results may 
indicate that either the method used in this experiment is not effective in changing 
taxpayers’ attitudes, or the priming activity affect their attitudes, but the change is too 
small, or these attitudes are not related to compliance behavior. 
Even though most of the effects of sympathy and empathy on tax compliance 
reported in this study are not very large, many of them are statistically significant and 
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help to explain tax compliance. These results reinforce the idea that noneconomic factors 
should be taken into consideration not only in tax compliance but also in many individual 
decisions. Although morality and moral aspects have not yet gained much attention from 
economists, increasing evidence rejects the assumption of individual self-interest present 
in much standard economic theory. Rather, the evidence suggests that individuals are also 
influenced by morality, social norms, and a sense of fairness. 
Alm and Torgler (2010) suggest three different methods that governments can use 
to reduce tax evasion. In addition to ―enforcement‖ and ―services,‖ they add a ―trust‖ 
paradigm in which policymakers acknowledge the importance of intrinsic characteristics 
such as morality and reinforce tax compliance by showing through the media that paying 
taxes is ―the right thing to do‖ or that tax payments return to society through the form of 
public services. Additionally, we can include policy on education of empathy and 
sympathy. These are emotions that can be nurtured in children very easily. As Brody 
(2010) mentions, creating a healthy self-esteem and a habit of reading stories that have 
examples of empathic behavior encourages children to behave with empathy. This paper 
reinforces the use of moral education for being beneficial to society since our experiment 
results demonstrate that inducing empathy on subjects and that observing higher levels of 
sympathy are associated with individual law-abiding behavior, or more specifically, 
higher levels of tax compliance. 
For future work, some projects could help to increase our understanding of the 
effects of moral emotions on tax compliance behavior. An interesting idea is to study the 
duration of the effect of eliciting these moral emotions on an individual’s law-abiding 
behavior. Moreover, extending the analysis of moral emotions to a different sample of 
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subjects consisting of older individuals who have experienced the decision of complying 
with taxes outside the laboratory can be beneficial for our understanding as well.  
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Table 1. The design of each session of the experiment 
Sessions Games / Activities 
S1 – Tax compliance game 
S2 – Tax compliance game 
S3 Priming activity Tax compliance game 
S4 – Tax compliance game 
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Table 2. The design of the one-shot tax compliance games 
Decision 
Tax 
rate 
Audit 
rate 
Fine 
rate 
Public 
fund 
multiplier 
Public fund 
Individual 
share 
(public 
fund) 
1 30% 30% 3 - No - 
2 30% 30% 3 2 Fully returned 1/4 
3 30% 50% 3 2 Fully returned 1/4 
4 30% 10% 3 2 Fully returned 1/4 
5 30% 30% 5 2 Fully returned 1/4 
6 30% 30% 3 2 
Partially returned: 
50% goes to the 
charities chosen 
by the group; 
50% returns to the 
group. 
1/8 
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Table 3. Summary statistics 
Variable Definition Observations Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
Priming 
Dummy variable equal to 1 if the subject has 
the priming activity at the beginning of the 
session and 0 otherwise 
48 0.500 0.505 0 1 
High DECS score 
group 
Dummy variable equal to 1 if the subject got 
21 or more in the Davis Empathic Concern 
Scale (0 to 28) and 0 otherwise  
99 0.505 0.503 0 1 
Blood donor 
Dummy variable equal to 1 if the subject has 
donated blood during the past 12 months and 
0 otherwise  
94 0.181 0.387 0 1 
Giving to homeless 
Dummy variable equal to 1 if the subject has 
given food or money to a homeless person 
during the past 12 months and 0 otherwise  
96 0.792 0.408 0 1 
Volunteer 
Dummy variable equal to 1 if the subject has 
done volunteer work during the past 12 
months and 0 otherwise  
91 0.791 0.409 0 1 
Giving to charity 
Dummy variable equal to 1 if the subject has 
given money to a charity during the past 12 
months and 0 otherwise  
89 0.685 0.467 0 1 
Declared Income Income declared to the Tax Authority 600 7.937 3.378 0 10 
Individual compliance 
rate 
Individual Tax paid/tax owed 600 0.794 0.338 0 1 
Audit rate Probability of an audit 600 0.332 0.125 0.1 0.5 
Penalty rate Fine rate paid if audited and evaded taxes 600 3.253 0.666 3 5 
Public fund 
Dummy variable equal to 1 if there is a public 
fund and 0 otherwise 
600 0.833 0.373 0 1 
Public fund to Charity 
Dummy variable equal to 1 if the public fund 
goes partially to charities chosen by the 
group and 0 otherwise 
600 0.127 0.333 0 1 
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Table 3. Continued 
      
Variable Definition Observations Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
Experienced 
Dummy variable equal to 1 if the subject is 
familiar with economic experiments (other 
than tax compliance games) 
99 0.869 0.339 0 1 
Times of experience  
Number of times the subject has participated 
in economics experiments if experienced 
86 4.430 2.822 1 17 
Sophomore 
Dummy variable equal to 1 if the subject is a 
sophomore  and 0 otherwise 
99 0.162 0.370 0 1 
Junior 
Dummy variable equal to 1 if the subject is a 
junior  and 0 otherwise 
99 0.343 0.477 0 1 
Senior 
Dummy variable equal to 1 if the subject is a 
senior  and 0 otherwise 
99 0.384 0.489 0 1 
Graduate 
Dummy variable equal to 1 if the subject is a 
graduate student  and 0 otherwise 
99 0.111 0.316 0 1 
Economics major 
Dummy variable equal to 1 if the subject is an 
economics, finance or business major and 0 
otherwise 
98 0.286 0.454 0 1 
Age Age of the subject  99 21.768 3.738 17 44 
Female 
Dummy variable equal to 1 if the subject's 
gender is female and 0 if male  
99 0.616 0.489 0 1 
White 
Dummy variable equal to 1 if the subject's 
race is white and 0 otherwise  
98 0.235 0.426 0 1 
Black 
Dummy variable equal to 1 if the subject's 
race is black and 0 otherwise  
98 0.582 0.496 0 1 
Asian 
Dummy variable equal to 1 if the subject's 
race is Asian and 0 otherwise  
98 0.133 0.341 0 1 
Born 
Dummy variable equal to 1 if the subject was 
born in the U.S. and 0 otherwise  
99 0.828 0.379 0 1 
Protestant 
Dummy variable equal to 1 if the subject is 
protestant and 0 otherwise  
99 0.303 0.462 0 1 
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Table 3. Continued 
      
Variable Definition Observations Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
Catholic 
Dummy variable equal to 1 if the subject is 
catholic and 0 otherwise  
99 0.121 0.328 0 1 
Christian 
Dummy variable equal to 1 if the subject is 
Christian without any denomination (neither 
protestant nor catholic) and 0 otherwise  
99 0.242 0.431 0 1 
Eastern religions 
Dummy variable equal to 1 if the subject's 
religion is one of the following: Islam, 
Buddhism or Hinduism  and 0 otherwise  
99 0.091 0.289 0 1 
Spiritual 
Dummy variable equal to 1 if the subject does 
not follow any religion, but has spiritual 
beliefs and 0 otherwise  
99 0.111 0.316 0 1 
Church attendance 
How often the subject has attended religious 
services last year 
95 1.779 1.400 0 4 
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Table 4. Average Compliance Rates per session by decisions 
      Average Compliance Rate 
Decision Tax rate 
Audit 
rate 
Fine 
rate 
Public 
fund 
multiplier 
Public fund S1 S2 S3 S4 
1 30% 30% 3 - No 0.67 0.76 0.75 0.77 
2 30% 30% 3 2 Yes 0.88 0.78 0.91* 0.78* 
3 30% 50% 3 2 Yes 0.96 0.94 0.97* 0.89* 
4 30% 10% 3 2 Yes 0.52 0.42 0.56 0.46 
5 30% 30% 5 2 Yes 0.93 0.90 0.89 0.91 
6 30% 30% 3 2 
Partially returned: 
50%  to charities; 
50% to the group. 
0.84 0.78 0.87 0.91 
Number 
of 
subjects 
     28 24 24 24 
T-test: *significant at 10%. 
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Table 5. Average Compliance Rates per variables of sympathy 
 Average Compliance Rate 
Decision 
High 
DECS 
Low 
DECS 
Donors 
(blood) 
Non 
donors  
(blood) 
Donors 
(homeless) 
Non 
donors 
(homeless) 
Donors 
(charity) 
Non 
donors 
(charity) 
Volunteers 
Non 
volunteers 
1 0.77 0.70 0.76 0.73 0.71 0.79 0.75 0.73 0.75* 0.61* 
2 0.83 0.85 0.81 0.84 0.82 0.90 0.83 0.87 0.83 0.83 
3 0.94 0.94 0.93 0.94 0.94 0.94 0.95 0.93 0.94 0.94 
4 0.58** 0.40** 0.60 0.47 0.49 0.46 0.53 0.47 0.49 0.43 
5 0.92 0.90 0.93 0.90 0.91 0.90 0.90 0.93 0.91 0.85 
6 0.85 0.85 0.92 0.83 0.83 0.89 0.83 0.85 0.85 0.83 
Number 
of 
subjects 
50 49 17 77 76 20 61 28 72 19 
T-test:  H0: mean(nondonor) – mean(donor) = 0 
**significant at 5% ; *significant at 10%. 
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Table 6. Tobit analysis of Individual Compliance Rate (Basic Model) 
  (1) 
Selected independent variables Marginal effects 
    
Audit rate 0.303*** 
 
(0.048) 
Penalty rate 0.023*** 
 
(0.008) 
Graduate 0.049** 
 
(0.021) 
Public fund to charity 0.026* 
 
(0.015) 
White 0.057*** 
 
(0.018) 
Black 0.026 
 
(0.018) 
Born 0.019 
 
(0.018) 
Church attendance 0.007 
 
(0.004) 
  Observations 558 
Log Likelihood -445.7 
LR χ2 87.07 
Standard errors in parentheses 
 *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
  
Reference group: sophomore; not Economics major; male; other race; not born in the 
U.S.; no religion; not experienced; Session S4. 
This regression also includes a public fund dummy (equal to 1 if there is a public fund in 
the decision and 0 otherwise), experiment session dummies, Experienced (equal to 1 if 
the subject has participated in other (non-compliance) experiments and 0 otherwise), Age, 
gender, Economics Major (equal to 1 if the subject is Economics major and 0 otherwise), 
religion affiliations. 
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Table 7. Tobit analysis of Individual Compliance Rate (only Empathy and Sympathy 
Variables in regressions) 
  (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Independent 
variables 
Marginal 
effects 
Marginal 
effects 
Marginal 
effects 
Marginal 
effects 
Marginal 
effects 
Marginal 
effects 
      
    Priming 0.019 
     
 
(0.013) 
     High DECS score 
group 
 
0.015* 
    
  
(0.008) 
    Blood donor 
  
0.022* 
   
   
(0.011) 
   Giving to 
homeless 
   
-0.012 
  
    
(0.010) 
  Giving to charity 
    
-0.004 
 
     
(0.010) 
 Volunteer 
     
0.020** 
      
(0.010) 
       Observations 288 594 564 576 534 546 
Log Likelihood -244.6 -522.5 -496.1 -512.06 -467.25 -486.0 
LR χ2 2.26 3.01 3.68 1.34 0.16 3.94 
Standard errors in parentheses      
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
  
49 
 
 
 
 
Table 8. Tobit analysis of Individual Compliance Rate (Regressions include control variables of 
the basic model) 
  (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) 
Independent variables 
Marginal 
effects 
Marginal 
effects 
Marginal 
effects 
Marginal 
effects 
Marginal 
effects 
Marginal 
effects 
              
Priming 0.017 
     
 
(0.020) 
     High DECS score 
group 
 
0.017 
    
  
(0.012) 
    Blood donor 
  
0.016 
   
   
(0.014) 
   Giving to homeless 
   
-0.014 
  
    
(0.013) 
  Giving to charity 
    
-0.023* 
 
     
(0.012) 
 Volunteer 
     
0.035* 
      
(0.015) 
       
Observations 264 558 528 540 498 510 
Log Likelihood -180.9 -444.8 -424.2 -434.5 -394.6 -409.8 
LR χ2 83.52 89.04 78.19 87.22 75.90 87.36 
Standard errors in parentheses      
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
     
 
Each regression includes Audit Rate, Penalty Rate, a public fund dummy (equal to 1 if 
there is a public fund in the decision and 0 otherwise), experiment session dummies, 
Experienced (equal to 1 if the subject has participated in other (non-compliance) 
experiments and 0 otherwise), Age, gender, race, college year, Economics Major (equal 
to 1 if the subject is Economics major and 0 otherwise), Born in the U.S. (equal to 1 if the 
subject was born in the U.S. and 0 otherwise), religion affiliations, Church Attendance. 
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Table 9. Tobit analysis of Individual Compliance Rate (Models with interaction 
terms) 
  (14) (15) (16) (17) 
Independent variables 
Marginal 
effects 
Marginal 
effects 
Marginal 
effects 
Marginal 
effects 
    
   Priming 0.151** -0.002 -0.084 0.145*** 
 
(0.068) (0.023) (0.052) (0.050) 
Blood donor 
 
-0.066 
  
  
(0.052) 
  Giving to homeless 
  
-0.089** 
 
   
(0.044) 
 Volunteer 
   
0.094** 
    
(0.046) 
Protestant 0.040 
   
 
(0.042) 
   Priming x Protestant -0.249*** 
   
 
(0.085) 
   Priming x Blood donor 
 
0.112** 
  
  
(0.044) 
  Priming x Giving to 
homeless 
  
0.109** 
 
   
(0.053) 
 Priming x Volunteer 
   
-0.160*** 
    
(0.055) 
     Observations 264 252 258 246 
Log Likelihood -347.4 -167.5 -176.3 -164.3 
LR χ2 82.3 83.01 86.25 90.38 
Standard errors in parentheses 
  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
     
Each regression includes Audit Rate, Penalty Rate, a public fund dummy (equal to 1 if 
there is a public fund in the decision and 0 otherwise), experiment session dummies, 
Experienced (equal to 1 if the subject has participated in other (non-compliance) 
experiments and 0 otherwise), Age, gender, race, college year, Economics Major (equal 
to 1 if the subject is Economics major and 0 otherwise), Born in the U.S. (equal to 1 if the 
subject was born in the U.S. and 0 otherwise), religion affiliations, Church Attendance. 
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Table 10. Number and percentage of subjects that have participated in each prosocial behavior at least once in the past 12 months 
by sympathy groups 
 
Blood donation Giving to the Homeless Giving to Charity Volunteering 
 
Total Percentage Total Percentage Total Percentage Total Percentage 
High DECS 9 19% 41 84% 36 75% 39 85% 
Low DECS 8 17% 35 74% 25 61% 8 17% 
Donors (blood)     13 76% 15 88% 15 94% 
Non donors  (blood)     59 79% 44 64% 53 75% 
Donors (homeless) 13 18%     53 78% 57 81% 
Non donors (homeless) 4 20%     7 35% 13 68% 
Donors (charity) 15 25% 53 88%     47 82% 
Non donors (charity) 2 7% 15 54%     19 70% 
Volunteers 15 22% 57 81% 47 71%     
Non volunteers 1 5% 13 68% 10 56%     
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Table 11. Correlation matrix with sympathy variables 
  
  
DECS 
Score 
Blood 
Donation 
Giving to 
Homeless Volunteering 
Giving to 
Charity 
DECS Score  1 
    Blood Donation -0.0148 1 
   Giving to Homeless 0.1922* 0.0589 1 
  Volunteering 0.1366* 0.3318* -0.0144 1 
 Giving to Charity 0.1625* 0.2788* 0.3158* 0.1453* 1 
* Significant at the .01 level. 
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Table 12. Results for the extraction of component factors 
Factor Eigenvalue Difference Proportion Cumulative 
Factor1 1.588 0.487 0.397 0.397 
Factor2 1.102 0.395 0.275 0.673 
Factor3 0.706 0.103 0.177 0.849 
Factor4 0.604 . 0.151 1 
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Table 13. Pattern matrix (rotated factor loadings) 
  Factor1 Factor2 Uniqueness
†
 
Blood Donation 0.730 0.163 0.395 
Giving to Homeless -0.199 0.881 0.250 
Volunteering 0.837 -0.181 0.324 
Giving to Charity 0.280 0.711 0.341 
†
Uniqueness is related to the proportion of variance of the variable that is not accounted for by all of the 
factors considered. If the uniqueness value is high, it indicates that the importance of the variable in the 
principal components analysis model is low. 
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Table 14. Tobit analysis of Individual Compliance Rate (Models with factor scores 
from principal components analysis) 
  (18) (19)
†
 (20) (21)
†
 
Independent variables 
Marginal 
effects 
Marginal 
effects 
Marginal 
effects 
Marginal 
effects 
    
   Factor1 (High-cost) 0.009** 0.008 -0.021 0.014 
 
(0.005) (0.006) (0.015) (0.034) 
Factor2 (Low-cost) -0.006 -0.017*** 0.008 -0.072*** 
 
(0.005) (0.006) (0.014) (0.025) 
Priming 
  
0.005 -0.022 
   
(0.025) (0.027) 
Priming x Factor1 (High-
cost) 
   
-0.034 
    
(0.039) 
Priming x Factor2 (Low-
cost) 
   
0.126*** 
    
(0.032) 
     Observations 480 444 204 204 
Log Likelihood -420.5 -350.1 -130.1 -122.0 
LR χ2 5.21 77.11 63.48 79.85 
Standard errors in parentheses 
  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
    
† 
These regressions include Audit Rate, Penalty Rate, a public fund dummy (equal to 1 if 
there is a public fund in the decision and 0 otherwise), experiment session dummies, 
Experienced (equal to 1 if the subject has participated in other (non-compliance) 
experiments and 0 otherwise), Age, gender, race, college year, Economics Major (equal 
to 1 if the subject is Economics major and 0 otherwise), Born in the U.S. (equal to 1 if the 
subject was born in the U.S. and 0 otherwise), religion affiliations, Church Attendance. 
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ESSAY 2: DOES RELIGIOUS EDUCATION INFLUENCE MONEY AND TIME 
DONATIONS IN ADULTHOOD? 
Introduction 
Understanding giving behavior is very important for policymakers. One main 
reason is that this private provision can be a replacement for publicly provided goods and 
services. Consequently, for decades, several social scientists have investigated the factors 
that help to explain philanthropy. Many economists have considered the effects of public 
policy instruments such as income taxes and government spending as their main focus 
(Clotfelter, 1985). However, more recently, some researchers have become interested in 
the motivations of giving such as altruism or reciprocity, in the context of experiments 
(Fehr & Schmidt, 2006). Many sociologists and psychologists have examined the role of 
social characteristics, personality traits and participation in associations (Smith, 1994). 
Within this last group, many studies have emphasized the important part of religiosity in 
philanthropic activities (Jackson, Bachmeier, Wood & Craft, 1995; Putnam, 2000; 
Brooks, 2004; Lam, 2002; Ruiter & De Graaf, 2006).  
Religious individuals are more likely to donate their time or money not only 
because of their faith or convictions, but also because volunteering time or donating cash 
to religious congregations become an important tool of their involvement in the religious 
community, a way of having benefits in return either by the services offered to the 
community, by the skills developed during a volunteer work or by the enhanced 
enlightenment derived from giving per se, or warm glow (Wuthnow, 1990; Wilson & 
Janoski, 1995; Clotfelter, 1985; Ziemek, 2006; Brooks, 2004; Andreoni, 2006). Other 
possible explanation for giving is altruism which means giving with no selfish motives. 
As Clotfelter (1985) states, altruistic behavior can be founded on sympathetic feelings for 
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others while Wuthnow (1991) argues that most people give importance to compassion 
because they have been taught to through their religions. Thus, religious teachings could 
be relevant in explaining philanthropic activities by affecting one’s level of sympathy 
since one of their main teachings is to be compassionate.  
The focus of this paper is on religious education and its effects on time and cash 
donations in adulthood. Differently from previous research that has measured religiosity 
based on church attendance and religious affiliation, our main contribution is to take the 
contact to religious teachings through religious schools into consideration instead. If there 
is evidence that attending a religious school is associated with higher levels of charitable 
donation, then religious or moral education may be a good tool to promote generosity. 
Also, this possible result is important for policymakers since it produces benefits to the 
society, and it may lead to reduction in criminal activity.  
Literature Review 
Religion and Charitable Giving 
Many papers have found a positive relationship between religious variables and 
giving. Jackson, Bachmeier, Wood and Craft (1995) create four variables of religious 
participation based on church attendance, belonging to a group within a congregation, 
encouragement of the church to activities that help others, and whether the individual has 
a favorite religious TV show. Their results show that only association in a church group 
is statistically significant in the analysis. Brooks (2004) consider religiosity in two ways: 
religious affiliation and church attendance. By using a more appropriate model than 
previous studies on religion and charitable donations, he finds that being religious, 
defined as attending church once a week or more, has a positive and statistically 
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significant effect on giving and volunteering while secular individuals, who have 
attended church less than a few times a year or have no religion, are likely to donate less 
of their money and time. According to his results, religious denominations have small 
effects on donations. Lam (2002) examines if four different dimensions of religiosity 
affect participation in voluntary associations. The dimensions are participation (based on 
church attendance and being a member in a religious group, for example), devotional 
(based on religion importance, and frequencies of prayer and religious readings), 
affiliation (based on religious denominations), and belief (based on their opinions about 
the church responsibilities in social issues). His conclusion is that these four dimensions 
affect positively volunteering.  
These are a few examples of studies connecting some religiosity measures to 
charitable donations. As expected, they find a positive relationship between their 
measures of religiosity and time and cash giving. This paper presents a different measure 
that may affect one’s religiosity or morality, which is religious education.        
Religious Education 
Although there are many examples of research on the relationship between 
religiosity and donations, no work on the relationship between religious education and 
donations can be found. The main topic in the literature about religious education has 
been the difference in academic performances between students from Catholic schools 
and those from public schools.
9
 Some studies find that there is a positive relationship 
between attending Catholic schools and academic performance. For example, Sander and 
Krautmann (1995) and Altonji, Elder, and Taber (2005a) show that students from 
                                                             
9 The literature about religious education has focused mostly on Catholic schools due to the 
underrepresentation of other religious schools in the datasets studied. 
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Catholic schools have a higher chance of graduating from high school and of attending 
college whereas Neal (1997) finds some mixed results in this relationship. 
Another area of research is related to the effect of attending Catholic schools on 
non-academic outcomes such as risky behavior (e.g., drug use or suicide attempts).  
Mocan, Scafidi and Tekin (2002) argue that, if students in Catholic schools have better 
academic outcomes, they would be more likely to have more favorable non-academic 
outcomes as well. One reason is that the opportunity cost of engaging in criminal activity 
for example is higher for those who are likely to have higher labor market earnings as a 
consequence of better education achievement (Figlio & Ludwig, 2000). Also, Catholic 
schools tend to reinforce more discipline and have religious instruction. Both 
characteristics help to discourage bad behavior. Although Mocan, Scafidi and Tekin 
(2002) do not find any significant result, Figlio and Ludwig (2000) find a negative 
relationship between attending a Catholic school and risky behavior such as drug use and 
teen sexual activity. 
This paper investigates the effect of attending a religious school on another non-
academic outcome: charitable donations. As stated earlier, religious schools typically 
have religious education in their curriculum, which may develop or reinforce their 
students’ levels of generosity. According to Hand (2004), ―the study of religion is 
thought to be capable of serving a morally educative function regardless of whether or 
not pupils hold religious beliefs‖ (p. 152). Therefore, it is reasonable to suppose that there 
religious education leads to higher levels of donations because one of their main 
teachings is to care for others. According to this possible result, society benefits from 
moral education since there is more generosity.  
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One important issue that needs to be taken into account when analyzing the effect 
of religious schools is the potential for selectivity bias. Some individual and household 
characteristics may play a role in the choice of attending a religious school and in 
generosity. For instance, religious parents are more likely to enroll their children in 
religious schools. Also, if this is the case, children may be more likely to be generous 
because of the presence of religion in the household. These factors are related to a higher 
level of generosity that is beyond the effect of attending a religious school. On the other 
hand, some parents may place their troublemaking children to religious schools in order 
to fix their disruptive behavior. In this case, a lower level of generosity is expected due to 
an individual’s characteristics. Therefore, it is important to deal with this potential 
selection problem in when analyzing the effect of attending religious schools.  
Although we acknowledge the issue of selection in this research, we do not 
control for this effect due to limitations of the publicly available PSID dataset. In order to 
correct this problem, the use of instruments in the analysis is necessary. However, most 
of the instrumental variables used are related to some geographic information, such as the 
number of Catholic schools in the neighborhood or the proportion of Catholic population 
in the area of residence in the past (Kim, 2011). The publicly available PSID dataset only 
provides information on the state of residence and the size of the city. Thus, without more 
specific information on a respondent’s residence, it is not possible to have instruments on 
geographic information.  
In addition, another instrument that has been in the literature is Catholic religion 
(Evans & Schwab, 1995; Neal, 1997). Nonetheless, there have been some criticisms 
about the use of Catholic religion as an instrument when analyzing the effects of 
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attending Catholic schools (Altonji, Elder & Taber, 2005b). The reason is that Catholic 
religion may be correlated to the outcome that is taken into consideration in the study. 
For instance, we expect that religious individuals are likely to be more generous than 
nonreligious individuals. Therefore, a religion is not only influencing the choice of 
attending a religious school, but also affecting the level of donations (which is our 
dependent variable). As a result of the lack of available instruments, our paper conducts a 
limited analysis of the effect of attending a religious school on donations.     
Government and Charitable Giving 
Mostly economists have examined charitable giving by focusing on the influence 
of marginal tax rates over an individual’s decision on donations. Clotfelter (1985) argues 
that ―the income tax deduction is the most important single tax policy affecting the 
vitality of the nonprofit sector in the United States‖ (p. 25). The reason is that charitable 
giving can be deducted from income taxes, thus decreasing the price of donating money 
to charities. Thus, price and income elasticities have gained importance in the economic 
literature since they are both affected by taxes. 
There is a lot of discussion on the methods used in the calculation of price of 
giving. In terms of price, there are many aspects of the income tax that should be taken 
into account for a precise measure of this variable. Thus, a complete calculation becomes 
very complex. An easier method is to calculate the first-dollar price that is used in our 
paper. Feldstein (1975) was the first to implement it. It was created based on the 
existence of a correlation between the price of giving and the amount donated through the 
marginal tax rate that accounts for these contributions. The first-dollar price uses the 
marginal tax rate calculated as no donations were made, thus eliminating any dependence 
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between the price of giving and the amount contributed. As Clotfelter (1985) points out, 
the first-dollar price may be a poor measure of the price of giving in some cases; 
nevertheless, there is evidence that it is a probably a very close estimate of the price in 
most cases.       
In addition, the type of income to consider has been also an issue. Some studies 
have used adjusted gross income while others have calculated permanent income or 
relative income. Permanent income is based on Friedman’s (1957) idea of consumption 
depends on permanent income instead of real income in a given year. Some researchers 
have calculated the average of income for a number of years as a measure of permanent 
income. Others have taken into consideration the disposable income level of other 
individuals and created a measure of relative income. In this study, we choose to use the 
adjusted gross income as our measure, knowing that it is not the best representation of 
income for not considering relevant sources of income.
10
 
Another important issue involving the government and donations is the possibility 
of a crowding-out effect of government spending on private donations. If we assume 
interdependence
11
 in utility functions, the government spending on programs that 
improve the situation of those in need may reduce private contributions or provision of 
goods and services. Hence, in order to evaluate this effect, it is necessary to examine 
whether the public services and the private services are substitutable and the factors that 
affect one’s utility. This issue is not analyzed in this paper, but it will be a future 
extension of this work.   
                                                             
10 After creating a permanent income variable based on two-year average of family income, we find very 
similar results as when AGI is considered. Moreover, when permanent income is in the analysis, the 
number of observations drops. 
11 In other words, one’s utility depends on the welfare of the others. 
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Volunteering 
An individual can donate either money or time. Thus, some researchers have 
analyzed the relationship between these two goods: whether they are complements or 
substitutes. Menchik and Weisbrod (1987), by analyzing volunteer labor supply using the 
National Survey on Philanthropy of 1974, find that cash donations and volunteering time 
are complements. However, Duncan’s (1999) results, using the same dataset, failed to 
reject the hypothesis that they are perfectly substitutable. Andreoni (2006) states that this 
issue has not been answered yet by the published literature. 
Another important factor in volunteering is the wage rate. Menchik and Weisbrod 
(1987) include in their analysis a net wage rate which can indicate the opportunity cost of 
volunteering. Nevertheless, due to the use of this variable and to the limitations of their 
dataset, they have to reduce their sample to working individuals in single-earner 
households, thus excluding women from their analysis. To overcome the problem of 
ignoring women’s decisions, an alternative given by Clotfelter (1985) is a model in which 
the time allocation decisions are sequential. In other words, the volunteering decision 
follows the decision of being in the labor force. Based on this idea, Brown and Lankford 
(1992) use available time as an exogenous variable in their regressions of donations. In 
this paper, we use the same approach since we do not want to restrict our sample to 
working individuals who have information about wage rate available in our dataset.        
Hypothesis 
Religious schools by and large provide religious education in their curriculum. 
This type of instruction aims to develop moral character on students. Although some 
religious schools still rely on the traditional religious classes based ―on the notion of faith 
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as received truth,‖ many religious schools focus on personal development of main social 
values such as compassion, tolerance and justice (Bryk, Lee & Holland, 1993, p. 113). 
These are important values to develop because it may generate more generosity and less 
violence in society. As stated by Milbrath (1989), a society in which most people give 
importance to these values would have less crime and terrorism.  
One important characteristic of most Catholic schools for example is the religious 
activities, which involve community service programs. According to Bryk, Lee and 
Holland (1993), a large proportion of students participate in these programs. Some 
examples of activities are to visit a nursing home to talk to patients and to work in a soup 
kitchen to feed the poor. Although these activities are not restricted to students from 
Catholic schools (some students from public schools may have similar type of 
volunteering experience), these activities could reinforce the effect of religious teachings 
of values mentioned earlier.  
Mocan, Scafidi and Tekin (2002) argue that ―behavioral change may also be 
accomplished by education if education can alter tastes towards risky behavior, or if 
education can provide information regarding future costs of risky behavior‖ (p. 5). A 
similar statement can be made with respect to positive behavior such as charitable 
donations. The religious education may change the preferences towards charitable 
donations or it may show future benefits to the individual (e.g., ―going to heaven vs. 
going to hell‖) or to the society associated with an individual’s generous behavior. 
Preferences can be also affected by the presence of role models in the religious teachings 
or of religious figures currently working in the religious school (e.g. priests or nuns). 
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These are examples of factors that can change tastes of individuals who attend religious 
schools.  
This argument suggests that religious education can influence tastes for donations; 
therefore, it can affect an individual’s demand for charitable donations. Our hypothesis is 
that religious education acquired through a religious school affects an individual’s 
demand for charitable donations.   
Empirical Model
12
 
Based on the empirical models shown in Clotfelter (1985), in Menchik and 
Weisbrod (1987), and in Freeman (1997), we have an individual’s demands for monetary 
and time contributions are specified as:
13
 
   (1)        
where  
 j = 1 (money), 2 (time). 
 Gt measures contributions (i.e., Gt = Dt if monetary giving is considered, and Gt =  
if volunteering is taken into account) 
 Pt is the first-dollar price of monetary contributions. For nonitemizers, it is equal to 
one. For itemizers, it is equal to one minus the marginal tax rate
14
 (calculated based 
on setting charitable contributions to be zero).  
 Yt is the adjusted gross income (AGI). 
 Tt is the amount of available hours (sixteen hours minus hours of paid market work). 
                                                             
12 In this section, we suppress the individual-specific index i in order to have simpler notations. 
13In this paper, we do not explore a joint decision between time and cash donations. 
14 The marginal tax rates were calculated with the help of TAXSIM model which is available on the 
internet (http://www.nber.org/taxsim). Based on the information of each individual about income, state of 
residence, number of children, marital status and deductions collected from our dataset, the TAXSIM 
model provided the tax liabilities and marginal tax rates. 
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 Zt contains sociodemographic variables that change over time, and Z has time-
constant sociodemographic variables. 
 The dummy variable releduc is equal to one if the individual had attended religious 
schools when she was younger and equals zero otherwise.  
For estimation purposes of calculation of price and income elasticities, we 
transform the demands for contributions into the logarithmic functional form:  
 (2) 
 
where c is the individual heterogeneity factor and ut is the idiosyncratic error term. 
Clotfelter (1985) points out that the main assumption for the use of logarithmic 
forms is that the income and price elasticities are constants. However, this assumption 
may not be credible if proportional changes in any variable turn out to be excessively 
large. This can happen with the logarithmic function if its value is close to one. As a 
consequence of the steepness of this function at the vicinity of one, some studies such as 
Boskin and Feldstein (1977) have used some alternative forms by adding one or ten 
dollars to each contribution value. In mathematical language, for example, the term  
becomes  if we add ten dollars. Even though Clotfelter (1985) argues that 
there is no greater difference in the coefficients for those with lower contribution values 
in these alternative settings, we add a value of ten dollars to all monetary donations and 
two hours
15
 to volunteering time. We choose to increase by an insignificant value based 
on average of the dependent variables.   
                                                             
15 Two hours is the smallest integral number of time that would not cause STATA problems in the 
regressions such as missing standard errors. 
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Since our variable of interest is constant over time, we choose to analyze the data 
as panel data and as cross-sectional data (considering only the last years of data available, 
i.e., 2007 for monetary giving and 2005 for volunteering). As a panel, we estimate the 
effect of religious education using four methods
16
 of regressions: pooled ordinary least 
squares (Pooled OLS), fixed effects (FE), random effects (RE), and Hausman-Taylor 
(1981) (HT). As a cross-sectional data, we run OLS and tobit regressions.  
We have to consider that pooled OLS are biased and inconsistent in a panel data 
setting. By using pooled OLS, we ignore the existence of individual heterogeneity (c in 
our model) and put it in the error term. In the case of random effects, we assume that this 
factor of heterogeneity is uncorrelated with each independent variable. Thus, if there is 
endogeneity caused by the existence of individual heterogeneity, then the RE estimates 
are biased and inconsistent. Thus, the estimates of pooled OLS and RE should be 
interpreted with caution.   
In our analysis, assuming that some explanatory variables are not correlated to the 
individual heterogeneity factor may be too strong. One reason for this is that the 
religiosity or religious education may be correlated with either the individual’s tendency 
to religiosity (or morality) or the level of religiosity in the environment where the 
individual grew up (parents’ tendencies to religiosity, for example). These factors are not 
possible to quantify. Hence, they are included in the individual heterogeneity term and 
the endogeinety is very likely to exist. This theory reinforces the argument that the 
pooled OLS and RE are not good estimates.  
                                                             
16 Even though some techniques may not be appropriate due to the fact that their assumptions may be too 
strong for our dataset or our model, they may be useful in terms of comparison of the magnitudes of the 
effects.  
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An alternative, the Hausman-Taylor (1981) estimation, could be considered. They 
propose an instrumental variable estimator that can be more efficient than fixed effects 
(FE) estimator if in the model there are at least as many time-varying exogenous 
variables as there are individual time-invariant variables (Baltagi, Bresson & Pirotte, 
2003). Another alternative is the FE estimator. However, this type of regression method 
eliminates the time-constant variables. Therefore, in our analysis, the effect of religious 
education releduc is analyzed by separating the sample into two groups: individuals who 
have had religious education background and others who had not.  
Because of the limitations of some regression methods employed, different groups 
of sociodemographic variables are included in the regressions. In the fixed effects 
estimation, we include only variables that change or may change over time: age, age-
squared, childs (number of children in the household), married and unemployed dummy 
variables. In the other estimation techniques, other important sociodemographic 
information such as education, gender and religious affiliation is added.  
Data 
Our dataset is from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) conducted by 
the Survey Research Center, University of Michigan. It consists of a longitudinal study of 
a representative sample of the U.S. population and the household in which they live. The 
use of this dataset in our analysis is very suitable because it provides information about 
taxes, income, wealth, time and monetary contributions besides other socio-demographic 
and economic factors.  
More importantly, our variable of religious education is available in the wave of 
1995 and it is based on three questions asking whether the respondent had attended a 
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private school and if it was a religious school (either Catholic or other religious school) 
or not. From this information, we create four dummy variables based on the type of 
school attended: i) private non-religious; ii) Catholic; iii) other religious; iv) public. We 
do not take into consideration individuals who spend equal time in two or more types of 
school.  
In addition, our main dependent variables of time and monetary donations are 
collected based on several questions asking whether the respondent donated money or 
volunteered to certain types of organization and the amount of the donation. We combine 
the types of organizations into two groups: secular and religious. The reasons for that are 
the large amount of donations given to the latter and the ―not clearly philanthropic‖ 
nature
17
 of religious giving (Schwartz, 1970; Clotfelter, 1985). Moreover, the total 
amount of time and cash given is considered in our regressions. Therefore, we have in 
total six dependent variables, more specifically three for monetary giving and other three 
for volunteering. They are based on total, secular and religious giving. These variables 
are measured in terms of annual dollars for monetary giving and of annual hours for 
volunteering.  
One important characteristic of the PSID dataset is the possibility of having 
information about all members of the household. However, for the questions considered 
in our analysis, we have to restrict the examination to heads and wives and those who 
were respondents since some of the questions were asked only to them. In addition, our 
dataset consists of four waves (2001, 2003, 2005 and 2007) for monetary giving and two 
                                                             
17 A large part of religious donations covers the expenses of the congregations, thus limiting the amount 
received by the needy. 
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waves (2003 and 2005) for volunteering when the questions about philanthropy were 
asked.  
Table 15 shows the summary statistics of the variables used in this study. We 
have approximately 50,000 observations with the fours waves (an average of about 
14,000 unique ID’s per wave). From this sample, twenty-two percent is female, sixty 
percent is married and fifteen percent single, sixty-six percent employed and sixteen 
percent retired. The weighted mean of age is forty-nine years and of schooling is thirteen 
years. About eighty percent is white, and eleven percent is black. Also, eighty-eight 
percent has a religion denomination, and from this group, fifty-six percent declares to be 
Protestant and twenty-five, Catholic. With respect to the important information for our 
analysis (religious education), eighty-one percent of respondents had attended a public 
school, eleven percent had attended a Catholic school, five percent had attended other 
religious school and three percent had attended a private non-religious school. These 
proportions are close to the percentages we see for the entire U.S. population. According 
to U.S. department of education, in 2007, taking into account all students from pre-
kindergarten to 12
th
 grade, 89 percent of them attended public schools, 4 percent attended 
Catholic schools, 4 percent attended other religious schools and 2 percent attended 
nonsectarian schools. 
In Figure 1, we have a couple of graphs presenting the weighted mean of 
contributions by type of donation (time or money), by type of organization receiving the 
donations (secular or religious), and by type of school attended. The graph on the left is 
related to monetary donations, and the one on the right side contains information on 
volunteering. It includes all types of individuals. Moreover, in each graph, we have three 
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groups of bars and each bar represents a type of school. The first group indicates 
donations to secular organizations, the second group to religious institutions, and the last 
group is the total amount of donations.  
As we can see in the graph on the left, showing all individuals, individuals who 
had attended public schools have donated money equally among religious and secular 
organizations on average. Overall, they are the ones who have given money the most in 
the comparison of the means. The individuals who went to private non-religious schools 
come in second in average of total amount of cash donations. They tend to donate more 
to religious institutions. The contrary is true to the respondents who attended Catholic 
schools. They donated more to secular than to religious organizations and they are third 
in average of total cash donations. Those who attended other religious schools are the 
ones who donated the least mean amount of money. Thus, in terms of average total cash 
donations, religious education does not seem to have a greater impact on contributions 
given that the individuals who attended non-religious schools are bigger donators in this 
setting.    
In terms of volunteering, except for those who went to other religious school, 
individuals have volunteered more to secular than to religious organizations on average. 
This can be seen in the graph on the right for time donations. All individuals have 
volunteered on average between fifty and seventy annual hours when we consider total 
volunteering. The ones who went to Catholic schools have the highest average of sixty-
seven annual hours. Private non-religious schools come in second with sixty-five annual 
hours. The ones who have volunteered the least on average are the ones who attended 
public schools and other religious schools. Therefore, we can observe that those who 
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attended religious schools may have preference for volunteering because they have 
higher or equal (lower) mean values of volunteering (of cash donations) than non-
religious schools. Nonetheless, a more rigorous analysis is necessary to facilitate the 
understanding of the effect of religious education on preferences and on contributions.   
Results 
As we indicated earlier, we estimate the effect of religious education using a panel 
and a cross-sectional data. This section is divided into the regression methods used.  
Panel Data Results 
Monetary Giving 
In Table 16, we present the results of pooled OLS, RE and HT regressions. The 
coefficients for Attended Catholic school and Attended other religious school are positive 
and statistically significant in most of the regressions. According to our pooled OLS and 
RE estimation results, attending a Catholic school increases secular monetary giving by 
about fifteen percent, religious giving by about twenty percent, and total monetary giving 
by twenty-five percent. Attending other religious schools seems to have a larger effect 
(eighty percent) mostly on religious giving. This difference in focus of donation between 
those who attended Catholic schools and those who attended other religious schools may 
be explained by the fact that many of the last group may be from Protestant families, and 
Protestants tend to volunteer and to donate money more to religious than to secular 
causes.  
The HT estimates for religious education are also positive and statistically 
significant at one percent level. However, the coefficients and the standard errors are very 
large. For example, by attending other religious schools, the amount donated to secular 
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organizations increase by thirteen hundred percent.  Thus, we could assume that the 
effect of religious education on monetary contributions to secular or religious 
organizations or both is positive. Nevertheless, we need caution when interpreting these 
results since there is heterogeneity bias in the pooled OLS and RE estimations, and 
possible collinearity of the instrumental variables used in the HT estimation.  
One important characteristic of HT regressions is that the price elasticities are 
close to the usual values found in previous literature. As Clotfelter (1985) reports, the 
consensus is that the price elasticity stays around negative one and three tenths. The HT 
estimates for secular and religious giving are close to this estimate. For total giving, the 
elasticity changes to negative one and eight tenths. On the other hand, income elasticities 
are usually around seven tenths (Clotfelter, 1985). The HT estimates of income 
elasticities are lower than this number. They are about eighteen hundredths in two 
regressions, but still indicating that monetary contributions are a luxury good.  
Another option of analyzing the effect of religious education is by separating the 
sample into the individuals who had attended religious schools and those who had not. 
Using this method, Table 17 shows the consistent FE estimates of the smaller version of 
our model
18
. According to these results, the income elasticities are positive and 
statistically significant at five and ten percent levels. Nonetheless, the coefficients are 
smaller than one in most regressions, thus becoming a necessity good mostly for 
individuals without religious education or for all individuals. In addition, the demand for 
contributions for individuals who had attended religious schools is more price elastic than 
the ones with no religious education. Therefore, the individuals from religious schools 
tend to respond more, by changing their amount of monetary contributions, to changes in 
                                                             
18 As we stated earlier, the FE regressions eliminates the individual time-constant variables.  
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prices than the other individuals. The coefficients for price elasticity are negative and 
statistically significant at one percent level in most regressions. As we can see, these 
results are the same for secular and religious organizations.  
Some consistent results are the effect of age and wealth. Younger and older 
individuals are less likely to give money to charity as we can infer from the statistically 
significant inverted U-shaped effect of age on monetary giving for all types of 
organizations. The existing literature typically finds that money donations increase with 
age. Also, for secular and religious organizations, an increase of one percent in wealth 
seems to increase the monetary donations by less than one percent for individuals without 
religious education and for all individuals. This effect increases slightly for individuals 
with religious education when donating to religious organizations. In the existing 
literature, greater wealth is also associated with higher levels of money donations. 
Having children and getting married also seems to increase donations of 
individuals without religious education. For them, one additional child increases 
donations by five percent to secular organizations and by thirteen percent to religious 
organizations. Getting married increases donations only to religious organizations by 
thirteen percent as well. Thus, religious institutions seem to benefit more from 
individuals without religious education when they start or increase their families. Another 
surprising result for religious organizations is the effect of available time in individuals 
with religious education. One additional hour of available time in a year increases 
donations to religious institutions by a little less than one percent. These results are 
surprising since we expect that the larger families would lead to higher living costs, as 
well as more free time means less labor income for the individual. Thus, there would be 
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less money available for donations overall. However, this positive effect could be due to 
a possible increase in church attendance in these situations.  
Volunteering 
Table 18 shows the results of pooled OLS, RE and HT regressions on 
volunteering. Once more, we observe positive and statistically significant effect of 
religious education on annual number of volunteering hours. Attending Catholic schools 
increases secular and total volunteering time by twenty percent, while attending other 
religious schools tends to increase religious and total volunteering time by thirty-five 
percent and twenty percent, respectively. Here, we observe an interesting pattern: those 
who attend Catholic schools are more likely to volunteer for secular organizations 
whereas those from other religious schools are more likely to volunteer for religious 
organizations. These results suggest that those who attended Catholic schools may prefer 
money donations to volunteering in religious organizations, and those who attended other 
religious schools may prefer to donate money and time to religious organizations. 
The cross-price elasticities given by the price of monetary giving are negative and 
statistically significant mostly for religious volunteering, indicating that monetary and 
time contributions are complements. This finding is similar to that of Menchik and 
Weisbord (1987) and Brown and Lankford (1992). Income does not have a clear effect on 
volunteering. In volunteering for religious organizations, the income elasticity is 
statistically significant in pooled OLS and HT regressions; nevertheless, it is negative in 
the first and positive in the latter. This inconsistent result may be a consequence of the 
issues with these estimations mentioned in the previous section.  
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An important variable for volunteering is the available time. In most regressions, 
this variable has a positive and statistically significant effect on volunteering. This result 
indicates that increasing work hours reduces volunteering time. For example, if an 
individual decides to enter the labor force to work full time, then there is a reduction of 
approximately fourteen percent of secular volunteering time. This reduction is lower for 
religious organizations, about seven percent. Another factor that has a positive effect on 
volunteering for secular organizations seems to be wealth. The coefficients are 
statistically significant at one percent level, showing that a one percent increase in wealth 
increases the number of volunteering hours by a little less than one-tenth of one percent.   
The FE estimates are in Table 19. The results show that the cross-price and 
income elasticities are not statistically significant. For individuals without religious 
education, age has a statistically significant inverted U-shaped effect on volunteering 
mainly with secular organizations. When considering all individuals, the same effect of 
age can be observed when volunteering for either secular or religious organizations or 
both. Previous work on volunteering generally finds similar results. One explanation is 
that middle-aged individuals are more strongly involved with work and family than 
younger and older people (Wilson, 2000). Moreover, considering only individuals 
without religious education, more available time and wealth have positive and 
statistically significant impacts on time donations for secular and religious organizations, 
respectively, as seen in previous estimations.  
An interesting result of the FE regressions is the effect of getting married on 
volunteering for secular organizations. The coefficient is negative and statistically 
significant at five percent level. Getting married reduces annual hours of volunteering by 
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seventy percent if the individual had attended a religious school. This number is lower for 
the ones without religious education, about twenty-three percent. If getting married can 
increase monetary donations to religious organizations, at the same time it can decrease 
the number of hours of volunteer work to secular organizations. Therefore, it seems that 
individuals change behavior when they get married from volunteering for secular 
organizations to donating cash to religious institutions. This trade-off should be taken 
into consideration when promoting marriage among individuals.      
Cross-sectional Data Results 
Monetary Giving 
As can be examined in Table 20, the OLS and Tobit estimates are very similar for 
secular, religious and total giving. Attending Catholic schools has a positive and 
statistically significant impact on monetary giving at ten percent for secular 
organizations, at five percent for religious organizations, and at one percent for total 
giving. Attending this type of school increases secular giving by twenty-two percent, 
religious giving by thirty-five percent, and total giving by thirty-eight percent. Attending 
other religious school only increases religious giving by eighty percent at one percent 
significance level. Thus, these results of year 2007 confirm that religious education 
affects monetary giving in the adulthood and attending Catholic schools is more likely to 
increase giving to secular and religious organizations. 
The income elasticities are about four tenths for secular and total giving, and one 
tenth for religious giving. The low income elasticity is not unexpected. It may happen due 
to the fact that religious donations are less important for individuals with higher income 
as reported by Clotfelter (1985). On the other hand, price elasticities are too high, around 
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negative two and four tenths for secular donations and negative two and six tenths for 
religious giving. Therefore, most individuals respond more to changes in price of giving 
by decreasing their donations, thus taxes could affect secular and religious donations.  
Age is also an important factor for religious giving. As seen in Table 20, age has a 
U-shaped effect on religious donations, significant at the one percent level; that is, 
younger and older individuals tend to give more than others at middle age. Previous work 
finds that donations increase with age; however, with a quadratic term, the relationship 
tends to be an inverted U-shaped effect. Similar to previous research on monetary giving, 
being married, education, wealth, and religion affiliations increase monetary giving. 
Other statistically significant variables that affect religious donations are being 
unemployed or in other work status and being white or black. Except for unemployment 
(which decreases donations by sixty percent), the other factors increase donations, as 
expected. Hence, religious organizations can benefit from promoting families, from 
education, from their religion, and from an aging population. 
For secular causes, most of the variables mentioned earlier seem to have similar 
effects on giving. Being married affects secular giving positively while being separated 
decreases this type of donations. Furthermore, other work status increases giving to both 
organizations by seventy-five percent whereas one additional year of schooling increases 
secular giving by a little more than religious giving about twelve percent in the first case 
and ten percent in the last. Wealth also has a higher elasticity for secular giving than for 
religious giving. Its coefficients are all statistically significant at one percent. On the 
other hand, one surprising result, given that white and black races have a positive effect 
on religious giving, is the effect of Asian race on secular donations, which is negative and 
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significant at ten percent level. We have to consider that other religions are important for 
secular giving too and this variable includes all Asian religions. Therefore, unless the 
individual is Asian and does not have a religion or is Catholic or Protestant, the effect of 
being Asian on secular donations may be reduced by the effect of religious affiliation. In 
addition, women are more likely to donate to secular organizations. Being a female 
increases secular donations by thirty-three percent at the one percent significance level.    
Volunteering 
The effects of religious education on volunteering can be seen in Table 21. 
Attending Catholic schools increases total volunteering time by twenty-three percent 
whereas attending other religious schools has a greater positive effect only on religious 
volunteering of forty percent. Again, we observe that those who attended other religious 
schools prefer religious organizations when volunteering. These results support the 
argument that religious education may increase donations, in this case, time donations.  
With respect to cross-price and income elasticities, these coefficients are only 
statistically significant on religious volunteering. We find a negative income elasticity of 
five hundredths at ten percent significance level. Thus, religious volunteering can be seen 
as an inferior good in this case. It can be a reflection of less importance given to religious 
donations by individuals with higher income or the higher value of time they have 
compared to lower income individuals. The cross-price elasticity is equal to negative 
sixty-six hundredths for religious volunteering, and seventy-six hundredths for total 
volunteering. This reinforces the idea that time and monetary donations are seen as 
complements. 
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If we consider only religious volunteering, we can observe that age, differently 
from previous research, has a U-shaped effect on volunteer time, and other factors have 
negative and statistically significant effects. These variables with negative effect are 
being divorced (decreases volunteering by eighteen hundredths percent), being 
unemployed or disabled (decreases time donations by approximately forty percent each), 
and other work status also affects negatively religious volunteering by thirty percent. 
Some studies find that employed individuals (the omitted category in our estimations) 
tend to participate more in volunteer work. On the other hand, religious volunteering 
increases with level of education and being Protestant. These results are similar to the 
ones found in the existing literature.  
Having an additional child increases time donations in secular and religious 
organizations. Economic theory suggests that the value of time is greater as the number 
of members in the family increases, hence increasing the cost of volunteering. However, 
we have to take into consideration the fact that some parents may volunteer in order to 
provide services to their own children or to others. This is the direct benefit cause of 
volunteering explained in a previous section. In addition, a mother may decide to leave 
the job market or reduce the employment time in order to take care of her children.   
As expected, wealth and education play a role in increasing volunteering. The 
elasticity of wealth is equal to six hundredths at five percent significance level and 
education has a positive and statistically significant effect on secular volunteering. One 
year of schooling increases secular volunteering time by seventeen percent which is 
larger than the effect of schooling on religious volunteering. Thus, we can argue that 
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more educated people are likely to volunteer more time for secular than for religious 
causes. This is similar to the result of the effect of education on monetary donations. 
Other relevant variables in explaining secular volunteering are being widowed 
and being black, which have negative and statistically significant effects on secular 
volunteering. Being widowed decreases the volunteering time by ninety percent, and 
being black reduces time donations by sixty percent. These are large effects that should 
be taken into consideration. In terms of marital status, married individuals are more likely 
to get involved in volunteering, but Ruiter and De Graaf (2006) argue that singles are 
similarly active in volunteering.  (Recall that single is the base category in our 
estimations.) Also, some studies report racial differences in volunteering (e.g., whites 
tend to volunteer more than minorities). However, the existence of these differences 
depends on the estimation methods used (Mesch, Rooney, Steinberg, & Denton, 2006). In 
other studies in which education and income are controlled for, no racial difference is 
found. 
Conclusion 
Religious schools in general offer religious education in their curriculum as well 
as religious activities such as community service programs. These activities together 
seem to help the development of important values (e.g., compassion, tolerance and 
justice) that may generate more generosity and less violence in society. As stated by 
Milbrath (1989), a society in which most people give importance to these values would 
have less crime and terrorism. We argue that religious education may change the 
preferences towards behavior (more specifically, charitable donations). Our assumption is 
that religious teachings like religions can provide moral education to children regardless 
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of religious beliefs they may hold (Hand, 2004). This moral education can enhance one’s 
religiosity or care for others as many religions teach. 
This study examines the effect of religious education on donations during the 
adulthood. With this purpose on mind, we collect data from the Panel Study of Income 
Dynamics (PSID) from 2001 to 2007. This dataset also provides information about an 
individual’s educational background (whether she had attended a public school, a 
Catholic school, or other religious school) in the individual dataset of year 1995. By 
gathering the main variables together, we have four years (or four waves) to analyze 
monetary giving and two years (or two waves) for volunteer work. We decide to study 
each type of giving separately and in two manners, as a panel data and as a cross-
sectional data, due to the limitations of analysis of a time-constant variable in a panel data 
setting. 
One important issue to consider when studying the effect of attending a religious 
school on donations is selection bias. For instance, religious parents are more likely to 
enroll their children in religious schools, and religion (or being a religious person) is 
associated with higher levels of donations. Although we acknowledge the issue of 
selection in this research, we do not control for this problem due to limitations of our 
dataset. The limited geographic information of the residence of the respondents does not 
allow us to create reliable instruments that have sometimes been used in the literature. 
Thus, we acknowledge that our analysis is limited at some extent.  
Based on our analysis, religious education has a positive and statistically 
significant effect on monetary giving and volunteering. Attending Catholic schools is 
more likely to increase secular or total volunteering and attending other religious schools 
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is related to higher religious volunteering. A similar result is found in terms of monetary 
giving. The difference is that attending Catholic schools also increases religious 
donations at lower degree if compared to the effect of attending other religious schools. 
Therefore, the analysis of our data confirms our hypothesis that religious education is 
related to higher contributions of either cash or time. 
Other interesting results are related to the price of giving and income. Our results 
show some difference in price and income elasticities between the individuals with 
religious education and the other who had not attended religious schools. We learn that, 
for individuals with religious schooling, monetary donations are a luxury good, while the 
others have them as necessities given the results of higher income elasticity for secular 
giving. In addition, individuals who attended religious schools respond more to changes 
in price of giving than the ones without religious education due to the higher price 
elasticities for secular, religious and total giving that the first group has. However, when 
we analyze the entire sample of respondents, the price elasticities are greater than two in 
absolute value, thus indicating that more price elastic demand for monetary donations. In 
the results for volunteering, we find that the cross-price elasticity is negative and lower 
than one in absolute value. This result implies complementarity between time and cash 
donations. 
   Other relevant factor affecting donations is age. In examining the panel data in a 
fixed effects estimation, we observe that age has an inverted U-shape effect on monetary 
contributions for all types of individuals and on secular and total volunteering for 
individuals who had not attended religious schools. This effect means that donations 
increase up to a certain age, then decreases. This result is similar to the findings in the 
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existing literature. When we analyze the cross-sectional data (considering only the last 
year of available data for cash and time donations), we find the opposite effect, a U-
shaped form. In other words, the donations decrease as an individual gets older and after 
a certain point they rise again. As Clotfelter reports (1985), using data from Gallup 
organization, volunteering reaches its maximum in the 35-44 age group and monetary 
giving rises with age but at a decreasing rate. We believe that an event must have 
occurred that affected the level of donations of each age group in the last years examined 
in the cross-sectional data analysis (2007 for monetary giving and 2005 for volunteering).  
 Some other variables also play an important role in explaining donations such as 
education, number of children and marriage. Level of schooling affects donations 
positively and its effect is greater when dealing with cash and time donations to secular 
organizations. Having an additional child increases monetary donations. Surprisingly, it 
also stimulates volunteering and one of the explanations for that is the possibility of a 
direct benefit. In other words, parents may volunteer to offer services to their own 
children or to others. Being married also causes an increase in monetary giving for 
secular and religious organizations. Nevertheless, it affects negatively the number of 
volunteer work hours for secular organizations.  
In conclusion, this paper suggests a new idea of possible policy for policy-
makers: moral education. A lot of debate has emerged recently about changing the public 
school curriculum. One of the main issues is to implement some form of religious 
education or civic instruction in order to increase tolerance and understanding of key 
problems faced nowadays such as terrorism.  This paper suggests that religious education 
may also affect positively charitable donations since our results show that religious 
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education may be related to higher contributions of time and cash. This positive effect 
represents benefits to society as well, thus it is an important factor to be considered by 
policymakers. However, we need to take into consideration the limitation of our analysis 
due to the selection bias that is present in our model. Besides the correction of the 
selection problem, more interesting information such as local public expenditures and 
poverty rates will be added in the analysis in the future.   
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Table 15. Summary statistics 
Variable Description Observations 
Weighted 
mean 
Standard 
Error 
Minimum Maximum 
Secular giving 
Annual amount of dollars donated to 
secular organizations 
56,494 924,702.60 65,508.0 0 400,000,000 
Religious giving 
Annual amount of dollars donated to 
religious organizations 
55,702 456,519.60 36,197.8 0 100,000,000 
Total giving 
Total annual amount donated to 
organizations 
56,494 1,381,222.00 86,489.8 0 500,000,000 
Secular volunteering 
Annual number of volunteering hours 
in secular organizations 
24,365 33.9 1.4 0 5,840 
Religious 
volunteering 
Annual number of volunteering hours 
in religious organizations 
24,344 20.4 0.9 0 5,475 
Total volunteering 
Total annual number of volunteering 
hours 
24,365 54.4 1.7 0 5,876 
Attended public 
school 
Dummy variable equal to 1 if 
respondent had attended public 
school and 0 otherwise 
22,592 0.81 0.003 0 1 
Attended private non-
religious school 
Dummy variable equal to 1 if 
respondent had attended private non-
religious school and 0 otherwise 
22,563 0.03 0.001 0 1 
Attended Catholic 
school 
Dummy variable equal to 1 if 
respondent had attended Catholic 
school and 0 otherwise 
22,563 0.11 0.003 0 1 
Attended other 
religious school 
Dummy variable equal to 1 if 
respondent had attended other 
religious school and 0 otherwise 
22,563 0.05 0.002 0 1 
Price of giving 
First-dollar price of monetary giving. 
For nonitemizers, it is equal to one. 
For itemizers, it is equal to one minus 
the marginal tax rate 
49,251 0.90 0.001 0.42 1.40 
Wealth 
Wealth of respondent in dollars 
(includes home equity) 
57,614 322,869.60 6,597.1 -2,699,990 50,500,000 
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Table 15. Continued 
Variable Description Observations 
Weighted 
mean 
Standard 
Error 
Minimum Maximum 
AGI Adjusted Gross Income 57,614 62,164.55 492.2 -23,000 3,660,000 
Available time 
Annual number of available hours  
(16 h x 365 days minus annual 
number of work hours)  
49,901 4,418 6.3 16 5,840 
Age Age of respondent 50,258 49.06 0.10 16 101 
Female 
Dummy variable equal to 1 if the 
respondent's gender is female and 0 if 
male  
57,614 0.22 0.002 0 1 
Childs Number of children in the household 57,614 0.69 0.01 0 9 
Adults 
Number of people in the household 
excluding children, and head of the 
household.  
57,614 1.10 0.005 0 11 
Single 
Dummy variable equal to 1 if the 
respondent's marital status is single 
and 0 otherwise  
57,614 0.15 0.002 0 1 
Married 
Dummy variable equal to 1 if the 
respondent's marital status is married 
and 0 otherwise  
57,614 0.61 0.003 0 1 
Widowed 
Dummy variable equal to 1 if the 
respondent's marital status is 
widowed and 0 otherwise  
57,614 0.08 0.002 0 1 
Divorced 
Dummy variable equal to 1 if the 
respondent's marital status is 
divorced and 0 otherwise  
57,614 0.13 0.002 0 1 
Separated 
Dummy variable equal to 1 if the 
respondent's marital status is 
separated and 0 otherwise  
57,614 0.03 0.001 0 1 
Employed 
Dummy variable equal to 1 if the 
respondent is currently employed and 
0 otherwise  
49,847 0.66 0.003 0 1 
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Table 15. Continued 
Variable Description Observations 
Weighted 
mean 
Standard 
Error 
Minimum Maximum 
Unemployed 
Dummy variable equal to 1 if the 
respondent is currently unemployed 
and 0 otherwise  
49,847 0.03 0.001 0 1 
Retired 
Dummy variable equal to 1 if the 
respondent is retired and 0 otherwise  
49,847 0.16 0.002 0 1 
Disabled 
Dummy variable equal to 1 if the 
respondent is disabled and 0 
otherwise  
49,847 0.03 0.001 0 1 
Housekeeper 
Dummy variable equal to 1 if the 
respondent is a housekeeper and 0 
otherwise  
49,847 0.09 0.002 0 1 
Other work status 
Dummy variable equal to 1 if the 
respondent has other work status and 
0 otherwise  
49,847 0.02 0.0007 0 1 
Northeast 
Dummy variable equal to 1 if the 
respondent's current region is 
Northeast and 0 otherwise  
57,609 0.19 0.002 0 1 
North central 
Dummy variable equal to 1 if the 
respondent's current region is North 
Central and 0 otherwise  
57,609 0.27 0.002 0 1 
West 
Dummy variable equal to 1 if the 
respondent's current region is West 
and 0 otherwise  
57,609 0.21 0.002 0 1 
South 
Dummy variable equal to 1 if the 
respondent's current region is South 
and 0 otherwise  
57,609 0.32 0.002 0 1 
Alaska or Hawai 
Dummy variable equal to 1 if the 
respondent's current state is Alaska 
or Hawaii and 0 otherwise 
57,609 0.00 0.0003 0 1 
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Table 15. Continued 
Variable Description Observations 
Weighted 
mean 
Standard 
Error 
Minimum Maximum 
Foreign country 
Dummy variable equal to 1 if the 
respondent's current region is a 
foreign country and 0 otherwise  
57,609 0.00 0.0004 0 1 
Education Years of education 46,490 13.11 0.017 1 17 
White 
Dummy variable equal to 1 if the 
respondent's race is white and 0 
otherwise  
49,131 0.81 0.002 0 1 
Black 
Dummy variable equal to 1 if the 
respondent's race is black and 0 
otherwise  
49,131 0.11 0.002 0 1 
Asian 
Dummy variable equal to 1 if the 
respondent's race is Asian and 0 
otherwise  
49,131 0.02 0.001 0 1 
Other race 
Dummy variable equal to 1 if the 
respondent belongs to other race and 
0 otherwise  
49,131 0.06 0.001 0 1 
No religion, atheist, 
or agnostic 
Dummy variable equal to 1 if the 
respondent does not have a religion 
or is atheist or agnostic and 0 
otherwise  
47,877 0.12 0.002 0 1 
Religious 
Dummy variable equal to 1 if the 
respondent has a religion and 0 
otherwise  
47,877 0.88 0.002 0 1 
Catholic 
Dummy variable equal to 1 if the 
respondent is Catholic and 0 
otherwise 
47,877 0.25 0.003 0 1 
Protestant 
Dummy variable equal to 1 if the 
respondent is Protestant and 0 
otherwise  
47,877 0.56 0.003 0 1 
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Table 15. Continued 
Variable Description Observations 
Weighted 
mean 
Standard 
Error 
Minimum Maximum 
Other religion 
Dummy variable equal to 1 if the 
respondent has other religion and 0 
otherwise  
47,877 0.07 0.001 0 1 
y01 
Dummy variable equal to 1 if the year 
of response is 2001 and 0 otherwise  
57,614 0.27 0.002 0 1 
y03 
Dummy variable equal to 1 if the year 
of response is 2003 and 0 otherwise  
57,614 0.26 0.002 0 1 
y05 
Dummy variable equal to 1 if the year 
of response is 2005 and 0 otherwise  
57,614 0.24 0.002 0 1 
y07 
Dummy variable equal to 1 if the year 
of response is 2007 and 0 otherwise  
57,614 0.23 0.002 0 1 
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Table 16. Panel data analysis of monetary giving (Pooled OLS, RE, and HT regressions) 
  
Dep. variable: Secular giving  
[ln(Dsec+10)] 
Dep. variable: Religious giving  
[ln(Drel+10)] 
Dep. variable: Total giving  
[ln(D+10)] 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Selected independent 
variables 
Pooled 
OLS
a
 RE HT 
Pooled 
OLS
a
 RE HT 
Pooled 
OLS
a
 RE HT 
                    
Attended private 
non-religious school 0.101 0.073 1.711*** 0.026 0.166 1.245*** 0.065 0.113 1.826*** 
 
(0.105) (0.120) (0.328) (0.131) (0.171) (0.291) (0.124) (0.151) (0.358) 
Attended Catholic 
school 0.127* 0.194*** 7.428*** 0.185** 0.256** 7.821*** 0.243*** 0.294*** 10.425*** 
 
(0.067) (0.073) (1.154) (0.073) (0.105) (1.066) (0.064) (0.093) (1.274) 
Attended other 
religious school -0.014 0.022 13.089*** 0.827*** 0.794*** 6.165*** 0.438*** 0.492*** 10.570*** 
 
(0.081) (0.090) (2.165) (0.097) (0.128) (1.993) (0.089) (0.113) (2.389) 
ln(AGI) 0.347*** 0.294*** 0.184*** 0.059* 0.124*** 0.093*** 0.265*** 0.261*** 0.181*** 
 
(0.031) (0.025) (0.035) (0.033) (0.028) (0.034) (0.033) (0.029) (0.039) 
ln(price) -2.551*** -2.372*** -1.375*** -2.508*** -1.907*** -1.344*** -3.299*** -2.919*** -1.755*** 
 
(0.158) (0.128) (0.170) (0.194) (0.141) (0.164) (0.182) (0.150) (0.190) 
Age -0.013 -0.010 0.101*** -0.162*** -0.010 0.049 -0.044* 0.026 0.145*** 
 
(0.020) (0.020) (0.035) (0.025) (0.024) (0.033) (0.024) (0.024) (0.039) 
Age squared 0.001* 0.000* -0.001 0.003*** 0.001 -0.000 0.001*** 0.000 -0.002*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) 
Female 0.238*** 0.137** 0.016 -0.122* -0.031 -0.085 0.125* 0.075 -0.045 
 
(0.066) (0.058) (0.097) (0.071) (0.072) (0.090) (0.076) (0.071) (0.107) 
Childs 0.091*** 0.071*** 0.039 0.269*** 0.148*** 0.105*** 0.160*** 0.099*** 0.042 
 
(0.017) (0.016) (0.027) (0.021) (0.020) (0.025) (0.019) (0.020) (0.030) 
Married 0.008 0.033 0.127 0.555*** 0.668*** 0.754*** 0.440*** 0.562*** 0.669*** 
 
(0.069) (0.061) (0.101) (0.080) (0.075) (0.095) (0.081) (0.074) (0.112) 
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Table 16. Continued 
         
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Divorced -0.250*** -0.119* -0.052 0.027 0.265*** 0.458*** -0.191** 0.075 0.315** 
 
(0.079) (0.069) (0.118) (0.088) (0.086) (0.110) (0.093) (0.084) (0.130) 
Unemployed -0.146 -0.178** -0.138 -0.445*** -0.197** -0.161* -0.442*** -0.317*** -0.195* 
 
(0.091) (0.078) (0.099) (0.124) (0.084) (0.095) (0.129) (0.090) (0.110) 
Education 0.158*** 0.134*** 0.033** 0.128*** 0.111*** 0.035** 0.183*** 0.163*** 0.040** 
 
(0.009) (0.008) (0.015) (0.010) (0.010) (0.014) (0.010) (0.010) (0.017) 
ln(Available time) -0.035 -0.003 -0.123 0.086 0.097 0.082 -0.040 -0.004 -0.103 
 
(0.102) (0.073) (0.102) (0.105) (0.082) (0.099) (0.105) (0.086) (0.114) 
White 0.359*** 0.139 0.319* 0.023 -0.176 -0.008 0.174 -0.001 0.242 
 
(0.134) (0.115) (0.184) (0.165) (0.140) (0.174) (0.158) (0.139) (0.204) 
Black 0.158 -0.077 0.771*** 0.054 -0.037 0.694*** -0.046 -0.163 0.858*** 
 
(0.145) (0.119) (0.219) (0.177) (0.148) (0.205) (0.171) (0.145) (0.243) 
Asian -0.669* -0.289 -0.240 -0.761* -1.139*** -1.653*** -0.595** -0.661* -0.768 
 
(0.358) (0.318) (0.632) (0.433) (0.433) (0.584) (0.262) (0.397) (0.696) 
Catholic 0.107 0.163** 0.622* 0.582*** 0.460*** 0.291 0.191** 0.263*** 0.632* 
 
(0.069) (0.073) (0.333) (0.074) (0.101) (0.322) (0.074) (0.092) (0.372) 
Protestant 0.010 0.090 0.624*** 0.997*** 0.864*** 0.700*** 0.602*** 0.632*** 0.970*** 
 
(0.057) (0.058) (0.204) (0.064) (0.078) (0.198) (0.065) (0.072) (0.228) 
Other religion 0.337*** 0.329*** 0.602** 0.365*** 0.792*** 0.902*** 0.424*** 0.714*** 1.118*** 
 
(0.100) (0.092) (0.239) (0.116) (0.115) (0.231) (0.114) (0.112) (0.267) 
ln(Wealth) 0.145*** 0.130*** 0.053*** 0.085*** 0.082*** 0.046*** 0.159*** 0.138*** 0.068*** 
 
(0.013) (0.011) (0.016) (0.014) (0.012) (0.015) (0.015) (0.013) (0.017) 
y03 0.092* 
  
-0.248*** 
  
-0.159** 
  
 
(0.054) 
  
(0.065) 
  
(0.064) 
  y05 0.183*** 
  
-0.231*** 
  
-0.071 
  
 
(0.056) 
  
(0.067) 
  
(0.066) 
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Table 16. Continued 
         
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
y07 0.131** 
  
-0.287*** 
  
-0.155** 
  
 
(0.056) 
  
(0.067) 
  
(0.066) 
  Constant -4.319*** -2.864*** -2.832* 0.166 -2.632*** -2.868** -3.374*** -3.744*** -3.895** 
 
(1.029) (0.864) (1.457) (1.117) (1.003) (1.400) (1.097) (1.029) (1.625) 
          Observations 15,065 15,264 15,264 14,887 15,086 15,086 15,065 15,264 15,264 
R-squared 0.305 5,293 5,293 0.236 5,278 5,278 0.340 5,293 5,293 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Region variables included in the regressions. 
Reference group: attended public school; male; single; employed; other race; no religion/atheist/agnostic; (1), (4) and (7): year 2001.  
a
 Longitudinal family weights of all years are applied.  
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Table 17. Panel data analysis of monetary giving (FE regressions
b
) 
  
Dep. variable: Secular giving  
[ln(Dsec+10)] 
Dep. variable: Religious giving  
[ln(Drel+10)] 
Dep. variable: Total giving  
[ln(D+10)] 
 
(10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) 
Selected 
independent 
variables 
Only 
individuals 
WITH 
relig. 
education 
Only 
individuals 
WITHOUT 
relig. 
education 
All 
individuals 
Only 
individuals 
WITH 
relig. 
education 
Only 
individuals 
WITHOUT 
relig. 
education 
All 
individuals 
Only 
individuals 
WITH 
relig. 
education 
Only 
individuals 
WITHOUT 
relig. 
education 
All 
individuals 
                    
ln(AGI) 0.155** 0.061** 0.066** 0.016 0.045** 0.044** 0.101 0.055* 0.057* 
 
(0.074) (0.031) (0.029) (0.063) (0.022) (0.021) (0.080) (0.031) (0.030) 
ln(price) -1.281*** -0.546*** -0.614*** -1.229** -0.529*** -0.588*** -1.862*** -0.805*** -0.899*** 
 
(0.473) (0.163) (0.155) (0.542) (0.127) (0.125) (0.581) (0.161) (0.156) 
Age 0.108 0.198*** 0.199*** 0.219** 0.058*** 0.066*** 0.257** 0.190*** 0.193*** 
 
(0.121) (0.023) (0.023) (0.100) (0.020) (0.019) (0.118) (0.025) (0.024) 
Age squared -0.000 -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002* -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.003* -0.002*** -0.002*** 
 
(0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) 
Childs 0.044 0.055* 0.051* 0.064 0.133*** 0.129*** 0.060 0.115*** 0.110*** 
 
(0.080) (0.029) (0.028) (0.069) (0.028) (0.026) (0.076) (0.031) (0.029) 
Married 0.387* -0.029 0.007 0.040 0.129** 0.127** 0.264 0.048 0.070 
 
(0.217) (0.079) (0.075) (0.189) (0.063) (0.060) (0.212) (0.079) (0.075) 
Education -0.030 0.014 0.013 0.074* 0.007 0.009 0.025 0.012 0.012 
 
(0.051) (0.012) (0.012) (0.039) (0.009) (0.009) (0.050) (0.011) (0.011) 
ln(Available 
time) 0.245 -0.112 -0.080 0.644*** 0.063 0.115 0.597* -0.008 0.046 
 
(0.415) (0.105) (0.099) (0.179) (0.072) (0.074) (0.336) (0.106) (0.098) 
ln(Wealth) -0.040 0.059*** 0.054*** 0.100* 0.039*** 0.041*** 0.008 0.070*** 0.066*** 
 
(0.061) (0.017) (0.016) (0.055) (0.014) (0.014) (0.056) (0.018) (0.017) 
Constant -2.094 -1.116 -1.435 -7.975*** 1.661** 0.953 -7.111* -0.252 -0.818 
 
(4.690) (1.154) (1.096) (2.670) (0.800) (0.801) (4.017) (1.158) (1.080) 
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(10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) 
Observations 2,113 32,519 34,632 2,096 32,066 34,162 2,113 32,519 34,632 
R-squared 0.045 0.013 0.014 0.050 0.008 0.009 0.061 0.016 0.017 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
b
 Longitudinal family weight of only 2001 is applied. 
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Table 18. Panel data analysis of volunteering (Pooled OLS, RE, and HT regressions) 
  
Dep. variable: Secular volunteering  
[ln(Volsec+2)] 
Dep. variable: Religious 
volunteering  [ln(Volrel+2)] 
Dep. variable: Total volunteering  
[ln(Vol+2)] 
 
(19) (20) (21) (22) (23) (24) (25) (26) (27) 
Selected independent 
variables 
Pooled 
OLS
a
 RE HT 
Pooled 
OLS
a
 RE HT 
Pooled 
OLS
a
 RE HT 
                    
Attended private 
non-religious school 0.148 0.065 0.668* 0.007 0.054 0.365 0.144 0.087 0.987** 
 
(0.146) (0.127) (0.342) (0.109) (0.113) (0.278) (0.157) (0.148) (0.463) 
Attended Catholic 
school 0.215** 0.143* 2.224 0.037 0.005 -1.229 0.202** 0.128 1.107 
 
(0.088) (0.078) (1.509) (0.065) (0.070) (1.244) (0.094) (0.091) (1.871) 
Attended other 
religious school -0.097 -0.099 6.671*** 0.358*** 0.382*** 7.176*** 0.196* 0.232** 13.247*** 
 
(0.105) (0.099) (2.369) (0.096) (0.088) (1.940) (0.116) (0.115) (3.005) 
ln(AGI) 0.027 0.018 0.029 -0.063*** -0.007 0.067** -0.002 0.017 0.070 
 
(0.037) (0.029) (0.037) (0.023) (0.024) (0.031) (0.040) (0.033) (0.044) 
ln(price) -0.112 -0.358** -0.098 -0.714*** -0.571*** -0.296** -0.522** -0.667*** -0.169 
 
(0.198) (0.150) (0.170) (0.139) (0.124) (0.141) (0.215) (0.169) (0.197) 
Age -0.013 -0.017 0.074* -0.050** -0.053** 0.000 -0.053* -0.056** 0.066 
 
(0.028) (0.024) (0.043) (0.021) (0.021) (0.036) (0.031) (0.028) (0.055) 
Age squared 0.000 0.000 -0.001 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001 0.001** 0.001*** -0.000 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) 
Female 0.138 0.110* 0.117 -0.016 0.038 0.056 0.136 0.117 0.129 
 
(0.084) (0.066) (0.102) (0.056) (0.057) (0.084) (0.092) (0.076) (0.127) 
Childs 0.225*** 0.176*** 0.081*** 0.158*** 0.132*** 0.083*** 0.289*** 0.227*** 0.083** 
 
(0.022) (0.018) (0.030) (0.018) (0.016) (0.024) (0.024) (0.021) (0.037) 
Married -0.205** -0.138** -0.182* 0.067 0.122** -0.087 -0.095 -0.013 -0.219 
 
(0.084) (0.070) (0.110) (0.059) (0.060) (0.090) (0.093) (0.080) (0.134) 
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Table 18. Continued 
         
 
(19) (20) (21) (22) (23) (24) (25) (26) (27) 
Widowed -0.854*** -0.739** -0.346 0.160 -0.040 -0.277 -0.456 -0.483 -0.476 
 
(0.116) (0.294) (0.427) (0.332) (0.252) (0.350) (0.330) (0.337) (0.522) 
Unemployed -0.066 -0.211** -0.180* -0.234*** -0.193*** -0.123 -0.207 -0.315*** -0.266** 
 
(0.135) (0.091) (0.098) (0.076) (0.075) (0.081) (0.141) (0.102) (0.115) 
Disabled -0.242 -0.208 -0.034 -0.390*** -0.359** -0.096 -0.468* -0.413** -0.033 
 
(0.242) (0.177) (0.221) (0.109) (0.148) (0.183) (0.251) (0.200) (0.264) 
Housekeeper 0.269** 0.151* 0.034 0.005 0.011 0.015 0.232* 0.108 0.017 
 
(0.111) (0.077) (0.091) (0.092) (0.064) (0.075) (0.123) (0.087) (0.107) 
Other work status -0.320** -0.338*** -0.369*** -0.361*** -0.258** -0.181 -0.531*** -0.525*** -0.471*** 
 
(0.146) (0.129) (0.133) (0.063) (0.104) (0.110) (0.156) (0.144) (0.153) 
Education 0.148*** 0.144*** 0.075** 0.098*** 0.105*** 0.094*** 0.191*** 0.190*** 0.111** 
 
(0.013) (0.011) (0.035) (0.009) (0.010) (0.029) (0.014) (0.013) (0.047) 
ln(Available time) 0.348** 0.411*** 0.487*** 0.145 0.184** 0.193** 0.329** 0.435*** 0.504*** 
 
(0.137) (0.088) (0.111) (0.097) (0.073) (0.092) (0.151) (0.100) (0.126) 
Black -0.357** -0.241* 0.068 -0.198 0.008 0.100 -0.325 -0.127 0.275 
 
(0.178) (0.130) (0.203) (0.169) (0.109) (0.168) (0.213) (0.148) (0.240) 
Asian -0.228 -0.691** -1.451*** -0.194 -0.607** -0.283 -0.354 -0.992*** -1.656** 
 
(0.417) (0.329) (0.536) (0.488) (0.288) (0.439) (0.527) (0.381) (0.667) 
Protestant 0.145** 0.100 0.117 0.407*** 0.328*** 0.367 0.370*** 0.297*** 0.204 
 
(0.073) (0.064) (0.324) (0.050) (0.057) (0.270) (0.081) (0.075) (0.368) 
ln(Wealth) 0.065*** 0.066*** 0.052*** 0.006 0.020* 0.020 0.055*** 0.066*** 0.056*** 
 
(0.015) (0.012) (0.017) (0.010) (0.010) (0.014) (0.016) (0.014) (0.019) 
y05 0.115** 
  
0.033 
  
0.141*** 
  
 
(0.046) 
  
(0.035) 
  
(0.051) 
  Constant -5.012*** -5.286*** -7.560*** -0.730 -1.871** -4.517*** -4.749*** -5.802*** -9.353*** 
 
(1.353) (1.038) (1.706) (0.942) (0.875) (1.413) (1.489) (1.180) (1.994) 
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(19) (20) (21) (22) (23) (24) (25) (26) (27) 
Observations 7,547 7,664 7,664 7,544 7,660 7,660 7,547 7,664 7,664 
R-squared 0.106 4,582 4,582 0.108 4,581 4,581 0.138 4,582 4,582 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Region variables included in the regressions. 
Reference group: attended public school; male; single; employed; other race; no religion/atheist/agnostic; (19), (22) and (25): year 2003.  
a
 Longitudinal family weights of all years are applied.  
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Table 19. Panel data analysis of volunteering (FE regressions
c
) 
  
Dep. variable: Secular volunteering  
[ln(Volsec+2)] 
Dep. variable: Religious volunteering  
[ln(Volrel+2)] 
Dep. variable: Total volunteering  
[ln(Vol+2)] 
 
(28) (29) (30) (31) (32) (33) (34) (35) (36) 
Selected 
independent 
variables 
Only 
individuals 
WITH 
relig. 
education 
Only 
individuals 
WITHOUT 
relig. 
education 
All 
individuals 
Only 
individuals 
WITH 
relig. 
education 
Only 
individuals 
WITHOUT 
relig. 
education 
All 
individuals 
Only 
individuals 
WITH 
relig. 
education 
Only 
individuals 
WITHOUT 
relig. 
education 
All 
individuals 
                    
ln(AGI) -0.024 -0.037 -0.037 0.056 0.022 0.023 -0.053 -0.014 -0.018 
 
(0.143) (0.034) (0.033) (0.092) (0.023) (0.023) (0.145) (0.034) (0.033) 
ln(price) -0.339 -0.010 -0.037 0.094 -0.101 -0.092 -0.119 -0.031 -0.036 
 
(0.915) (0.180) (0.182) (0.399) (0.134) (0.126) (0.932) (0.200) (0.199) 
Age 0.331 0.183*** 0.184*** 0.355 0.039 0.057* 0.518 0.208*** 0.220*** 
 
(0.337) (0.041) (0.040) (0.220) (0.029) (0.030) (0.332) (0.043) (0.043) 
Age squared -0.003 -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.004 -0.000 -0.001* -0.005 -0.002*** -0.002*** 
 
(0.004) (0.000) (0.000) (0.003) (0.000) (0.000) (0.004) (0.000) (0.000) 
Childs 0.290 -0.032 -0.005 0.062 0.044 0.047 0.435** -0.024 0.016 
 
(0.194) (0.049) (0.048) (0.086) (0.035) (0.032) (0.168) (0.050) (0.048) 
Married -0.698** -0.234** -0.243** -0.082 -0.085 -0.073 -0.698** -0.202 -0.204* 
 
(0.320) (0.116) (0.109) (0.222) (0.097) (0.088) (0.334) (0.124) (0.117) 
Education -0.310 0.028 0.015 -0.143 0.160 0.145 -0.410 0.058 0.044 
 
(0.690) (0.114) (0.115) (0.146) (0.175) (0.166) (0.666) (0.106) (0.108) 
ln(Available 
time) 0.400 0.209* 0.226* 0.111 0.164 0.162 0.212 0.268* 0.272* 
 
(0.480) (0.123) (0.120) (0.290) (0.105) (0.100) (0.489) (0.145) (0.140) 
ln(Wealth) 0.081 0.038 0.040* -0.022 0.040*** 0.035*** 0.057 0.043* 0.043* 
 
(0.080) (0.024) (0.023) (0.044) (0.013) (0.013) (0.079) (0.025) (0.024) 
Constant -5.402 -5.554*** -5.563*** -5.701 -3.603 -3.884 -5.883 -6.963*** -7.088*** 
 
(11.904) (2.100) (2.092) (4.638) (2.558) (2.442) (11.561) (2.170) (2.151) 
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Table 19. Continued 
 
(28) (29) (30) (31) (32) (33) (34) (35) (36) 
Observations 1,052 16,258 17,310 1,051 16,244 17,295 1,052 16,258 17,310 
R-squared 0.035 0.007 0.008 0.020 0.005 0.005 0.051 0.008 0.008 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
c
 Longitudinal family weight of 2001 only is applied. 
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Table 20. Cross-sectional data analysis of monetary giving - year 2007 (OLS and Tobit regressions) 
Selected independent variables 
Dep. variable: Secular 
giving  
 [ln(Dsec+10)] 
Dep. variable: Religious 
giving  
 [ln(Drel+10)] 
Dep. variable: Total 
 giving                 
[ln(D+10)] 
(37) (38) (39) (40) (41) (42) 
OLS Tobit OLS Tobit OLS Tobit 
              
Attended private non-religious 
school -0.087 -0.087 -0.032 -0.032 -0.161 -0.161 
 
(0.193) (0.192) (0.233) (0.232) (0.210) (0.209) 
Attended Catholic school 0.221* 0.221* 0.348** 0.348** 0.379*** 0.379*** 
 
(0.122) (0.121) (0.146) (0.145) (0.116) (0.116) 
Attended other religious school -0.124 -0.124 0.804*** 0.804*** 0.257 0.257 
 
(0.157) (0.156) (0.179) (0.178) (0.174) (0.173) 
ln(AGI) 0.368*** 0.368*** 0.107* 0.107* 0.334*** 0.334*** 
 
(0.062) (0.061) (0.061) (0.061) (0.061) (0.061) 
ln(price) -2.441*** -2.441*** -2.620*** -2.620*** -3.334*** -3.334*** 
 
(0.300) (0.299) (0.366) (0.365) (0.322) (0.321) 
Age 0.009 0.009 -0.145*** -0.145*** -0.026 -0.026 
 
(0.035) (0.035) (0.041) (0.040) (0.038) (0.038) 
Age squared 0.000 0.000 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.001 0.001 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Female 0.330*** 0.330*** -0.196 -0.196 0.216* 0.216* 
 
(0.116) (0.116) (0.132) (0.131) (0.131) (0.130) 
Childs 0.030 0.030 0.199*** 0.199*** 0.067* 0.067* 
 
(0.033) (0.032) (0.039) (0.039) (0.035) (0.035) 
Married 0.221* 0.221* 0.571*** 0.571*** 0.580*** 0.580*** 
 
(0.125) (0.124) (0.136) (0.136) (0.135) (0.134) 
Separated -0.530*** -0.530*** -0.246 -0.246 -0.729*** -0.729*** 
 
(0.193) (0.192) (0.189) (0.188) (0.216) (0.215) 
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Table 20. Continued 
      
 
(37) (38) (39) (40) (41) (42) 
Unemployed -0.227 -0.227 -0.597*** -0.597*** -0.611*** -0.611*** 
 
(0.158) (0.158) (0.179) (0.179) (0.192) (0.191) 
Other work status 0.759*** 0.759*** 0.756* 0.756* 0.906*** 0.906*** 
 
(0.261) (0.259) (0.436) (0.434) (0.339) (0.337) 
Education 0.129*** 0.129*** 0.100*** 0.100*** 0.152*** 0.152*** 
 
(0.013) (0.013) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) 
ln(Available time) 0.087 0.087 0.215 0.215 0.286 0.286 
 
(0.191) (0.190) (0.194) (0.193) (0.193) (0.192) 
White 0.061 0.061 0.727** 0.727** 0.518* 0.518* 
 
(0.243) (0.242) (0.285) (0.284) (0.283) (0.282) 
Black -0.176 -0.176 0.731** 0.731** 0.234 0.234 
 
(0.263) (0.262) (0.304) (0.303) (0.302) (0.301) 
Asian -1.351* -1.351* 0.178 0.178 -0.179 -0.179 
 
(0.801) (0.798) (0.934) (0.930) (0.555) (0.553) 
Catholic 0.007 0.007 0.525*** 0.525*** 0.123 0.123 
 
(0.121) (0.120) (0.134) (0.134) (0.125) (0.125) 
Protestant 0.047 0.047 1.099*** 1.099*** 0.699*** 0.699*** 
 
(0.104) (0.103) (0.116) (0.115) (0.110) (0.110) 
Other religion 0.348** 0.348** 0.430** 0.430** 0.465*** 0.465*** 
 
(0.165) (0.164) (0.193) (0.192) (0.171) (0.171) 
ln(Wealth) 0.174*** 0.174*** 0.075*** 0.075*** 0.165*** 0.165*** 
 
(0.022) (0.022) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.025) 
Constant -5.628*** -5.628*** -1.775 -1.775 -7.093*** -7.093*** 
 
(1.914) (1.907) (1.968) (1.960) (1.914) (1.907) 
       Observations 4,157 4,157 4,096 4,096 4,157 4,157 
R-squared 0.341   0.255   0.402   
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
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*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Region variables included in the regressions. 
Reference group: attended public school; male; single; employed; other race; no religion/ atheist/ agnostic.  
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Table 21. Cross-sectional data analysis of volunteering - year 2005 (OLS and Tobit regressions) 
Selected independent variables 
Dep. variable: Secular 
volunteering  
[ln(Volsec+2)] 
Dep. variable: Religious 
volunteering  
[ln(Volrel+2)] 
Dep. variable: Total 
volunteering  
[ln(Vol+2)] 
(43) (44) (45) (46) (47) (48) 
OLS Tobit OLS Tobit OLS Tobit 
              
Attended private non-religious school 0.076 0.076 -0.002 -0.002 0.067 0.067 
 
(0.200) (0.199) (0.142) (0.141) (0.213) (0.212) 
Attended Catholic school 0.207 0.207 0.090 0.090 0.231* 0.231* 
 
(0.129) (0.128) (0.095) (0.094) (0.138) (0.137) 
Attended other religious school -0.123 -0.123 0.403*** 0.403*** 0.210 0.210 
 
(0.146) (0.146) (0.130) (0.129) (0.159) (0.158) 
ln(AGI) -0.016 -0.016 -0.054* -0.054* -0.036 -0.036 
 
(0.054) (0.054) (0.032) (0.032) (0.057) (0.057) 
ln(price) -0.378 -0.378 -0.657*** -0.657*** -0.760** -0.760** 
 
(0.290) (0.289) (0.210) (0.209) (0.317) (0.316) 
Age -0.018 -0.018 -0.066** -0.066** -0.069 -0.069 
 
(0.039) (0.039) (0.027) (0.027) (0.043) (0.043) 
Age squared 0.000 0.000 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001** 0.001** 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) 
Female 0.161 0.161 -0.017 -0.017 0.171 0.171 
 
(0.118) (0.117) (0.070) (0.070) (0.128) (0.127) 
Childs 0.208*** 0.208*** 0.183*** 0.183*** 0.305*** 0.305*** 
 
(0.032) (0.032) (0.025) (0.025) (0.034) (0.034) 
Married -0.049 -0.049 0.128 0.128 0.038 0.038 
 
(0.111) (0.111) (0.079) (0.078) (0.122) (0.122) 
Widowed -0.913*** -0.913*** -0.073 -0.073 -0.815*** -0.815*** 
 
(0.130) (0.129) (0.257) (0.256) (0.272) (0.271) 
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Table 21. Continued 
 
(43) (44) (45) (46) (47) (48) 
Divorced -0.007 -0.007 -0.178** -0.178** -0.097 -0.097 
 
(0.140) (0.140) (0.082) (0.081) (0.151) (0.151) 
Unemployed 0.188 0.188 -0.374*** -0.374*** -0.039 -0.039 
 
(0.203) (0.203) (0.076) (0.076) (0.210) (0.209) 
Disabled -0.277 -0.277 -0.431*** -0.431*** -0.476 -0.476 
 
(0.430) (0.429) (0.137) (0.136) (0.449) (0.447) 
Other work status -0.326* -0.326* -0.305*** -0.305*** -0.508** -0.508** 
 
(0.198) (0.197) (0.112) (0.112) (0.219) (0.218) 
Education 0.174*** 0.174*** 0.083*** 0.083*** 0.200*** 0.200*** 
 
(0.018) (0.018) (0.013) (0.013) (0.019) (0.019) 
Black -0.603** -0.603** 0.081 0.081 -0.445* -0.445* 
 
(0.260) (0.259) (0.159) (0.159) (0.269) (0.268) 
Protestant 0.090 0.090 0.457*** 0.457*** 0.345*** 0.345*** 
 
(0.107) (0.106) (0.063) (0.063) (0.115) (0.114) 
ln(Wealth) 0.056** 0.056*** 0.008 0.008 0.049** 0.049** 
 
(0.022) (0.022) (0.015) (0.015) (0.024) (0.024) 
Constant -3.550* -3.550* 0.084 0.084 -2.848 -2.848 
 
(2.119) (2.110) (1.281) (1.275) (2.247) (2.238) 
       Observations 3,989 3,989 3,988 3,988 3,989 3,989 
R-squared 0.109   0.119   0.143   
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Region variables included in the regressions. 
Reference group: attended public school; male; single; employed; other race; no religion/ atheist/ agnostic.  
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Figure 1. Weighted mean of donations per type of school attended 
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ESSAY 3: THE EFFECT OF SYMPATHY ON INCOME REDISTRIBUTION 
PREFERENCES 
Introduction 
Economists have suggested that financial self-regarding interest could explain the 
preferences for income redistribution. For instance, according to the median voter model, 
the demand for redistribution decreases with an increase in personal income (Fong, 
Bowles & Gintis, 2006). Nonetheless, some researchers have found that personal income 
weakly predicts the support for income redistribution (Fong, 2001; Gilens, 1999). In fact, 
it seems that a great percentage of poor people do not support income redistribution while 
many rich people do (Fong, 2001). Thus, other factors may influence the decision to 
support or to oppose income redistribution.  
Some examples of other factors are explored in the previous literature on income 
redistribution. Some research finds that beliefs on the causes of poverty (luck vs. lack of 
hard work) are likely to affect one’s support for income redistribution (Fong, 2001). Also, 
culture is an important factor since some cultures (some European countries for instance) 
are likely to give more importance to equality than others due to their historical 
experiences (Alesina & Glaeser, 2004). Besides a country’s historical experience, an 
individual’s income mobility experience also seems to contribute to differences in 
income redistribution preferences (Piketty, 1995).  
Another important factor is morality. According to psychology, moral standards 
may influence individual behavior by self-regulatory emotions such as guilt or pride. In 
our context, a wealthy individual may feel guilt for having more than others and may 
become more supportive of income redistribution. However, moral standards may be 
affected by other moral emotions such as sympathy. Many psychologists argue that 
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sympathy motivates moral behavior and plays an important part in morality (Eisenberg, 
2000). Sympathy is related to other-oriented feelings of compassion and the concern for 
unfortunate others. Some rich people may feel compassion for the needy because they 
consider that the poor do not have the opportunity to earn an adequate income. In this 
research, we observe how sympathy influences preferences over income redistribution. 
Hypothesis 
This paper has the goal of examining if sympathy contributes in explaining 
income redistribution preferences. As some psychologists have argued, individuals who 
feel sympathy have a concern for other’s welfare if they are in distress (Eisenberg & 
Miller, 1987). Another consequence of feeling sympathy would be to avoid causing a 
distress for others (Miller & Eisenberg, 1988). For example, not paying taxes could affect 
other’s welfare negatively by lowering their income or diminishing the availability of 
public services to others if there is income redistribution financed by taxes. Thus, we can 
expect that individuals who have higher levels of sympathy support policies that can 
benefit the poor, holding other variables constant. Income redistribution policy would be 
a good choice in this way. Therefore, we test the hypothesis that higher levels of 
sympathy are related to more support for income redistribution.  
Data 
We use the General Social Survey (GSS), managed by the National Opinion 
Research Center (NORC) at the University of Chicago, to observe the relationship 
between sympathy measures and income redistribution preference. The data consist of a 
collection of questions regarding demographics, opinions and behaviors of adults selected 
at random in the U.S.. Each year is an independent cross-sectional data, and many years 
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of the GSS have on average 2,800 observations. We limit the analysis to GSS waves of 
2002 and 2004 since these are the years in which our sympathy measures are available. 
Dependent Variable of Interest 
Our dependent variable is the demand for income redistribution given by a 
variable called ―EQWLTH.‖19 It asks the respondent if the government should reduce the 
income differences between the rich and the poor either by increasing the taxes of 
wealthy households or by offering income assistance to the poor. The answer is based on 
a scale from 1 = ―should‖ to 7 = ―should not.‖ After reordering this variable in order to 
show an increase in support for income redistribution (―REDISTR,‖ assuming values 
from 1 = ―should not‖ to 7 = ―should‖), we create a dummy variable showing the 
―supporters‖ of income redistribution (―REDISTR‖ is greater than 4) and nonsupporters 
(―REDISTR‖ is lower than 5). 
Independent Variables of Interest: Sympathy Variables 
In terms of sympathy, we are considering four variables: the Davis Empathic 
Concern Scale; an individual’s importance of personally assisting people in trouble; the 
frequency of careless feeling for others; and some prosocial behaviors. The frequency of 
some behaviors to help unfortunate people is taken into account in order to verify 
robustness of our results. 
The Davis empathic concern scale is a subset of the Interpersonal Reactivity 
Index (IRI) developed by Davis in 1980s (Davis, 1983). The entire scale has the goal of 
assessing the ―empathy‖ of the individual, i.e., the degree at which the individual puts 
himself or herself in unfortunate others’ situations. This scale has been used in 
psychology as a measure of altruistic personality (e.g., Carlo, Eisenberg, Troyer, Switzer 
                                                             
19 This variable was used in previous research (e.g., Alesina and La Ferrara, 2005). 
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& Speer, 1991) or as a tool to separate degrees of empathy in different groups of people 
such as prisoners (e.g., Lauterbach & Hosser, 2007). 
For the purpose of this research, we are only interested in evaluating how much 
someone is concerned about other people in need. The subset, the Davis empathic 
concern scale, gives this idea. It evaluates the propensity of an individual to experience 
feelings of sympathy for unfortunate people. According to Batson, the source of ―true 
altruism‖20 –i.e., helping exclusively intended to benefit the needy person –is empathic 
concern (as cited in Davis, 1996, p. 134): ―the stronger the feelings of compassion for the 
target [individual in need], the greater is the motivation to reduce the target’s need.‖ 
Therefore, we can expect that a person with a high level of sympathy may try to improve 
the welfare of someone who is worse-off, perhaps even at the expense of his or her own 
welfare. 
The scale is very simple. In addition, it has acceptable measures of test-retest and 
internal reliabilities (Davis, 1980) and construct validity (Davis & Franzoi, 1991). It 
consists of seven items. The respondents are asked to specify if these items describe them 
well or not –ranging from 0 (does not describe me very well) to 4 (describes me very 
well). For example, one of the items is ―I often have tender, concerned feelings for people 
less fortunate than me.‖ The responses to each of those items are summed; therefore, the 
scores can range from 0 to 28. The sample was divided into two groups by the median of 
                                                             
20 Usually ―altruism,‖ ―empathy‖ and ―sympathy‖ are considered overlapping terms across different 
disciplines. In economics, ―altruism‖ is interpreted as a concern for other that would be included in an 
altruistic individual’s utility as other agents’ wellbeing or monetary payoffs. We define ―altruism‖ as any 
generous behavior towards others, unconditional on rewards or punishments, that can be motivated by 
social norms or by moral emotions such as empathy or sympathy.  
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the DECS score in the sample (21): ―Low-score Group‖: the total sum of their responses 
is between 0 and 20; and ―High-score Group‖: the total sum is between 21 and 28. 
Two other sympathy variables are collected by asking the respondents the 
importance they give to helping worse-off individuals and the frequency they feel a 
selfless caring for others. ―PEOPTRBL‖ is related to the question about the importance 
the respondent gives to personally assisting people in trouble. The respondent has to say 
if he or she strongly agrees, agrees, neither agrees nor disagrees, disagrees, or strongly 
disagrees with the statement. We transformed this question into a dummy variable: 
―PEOPTRBL dummy‖ = 1 if the respondent strongly agrees or agrees; ―PEOPTRBL 
dummy‖ = 0, otherwise. The other sympathy variable referring to the frequency with 
which they feel a careless feeling towards others in their daily lives is called ―Selfless.‖ 
In order to test for robustness, we use two ways of coding this variable. We use the 
coding provided in an ascendant order (original coding):  ―SELFLESS‖ = 0, if never or 
almost never; ―SELFLESS‖ = 1, if once in a while; ―SELFLESS‖ = 2, if some days; 
―SELFLESS‖ = 3, if most days; ―SELFLESS‖ = 4, if every day; ―SELFLESS‖ = 5, if 
many times a day.  
We also believe that a good estimate of sympathy in individuals would be the 
actual behavior in favor of unfortunate others. In the survey, there are four prosocial 
behaviors taken into account: blood donation (―GIVBLOOD‖), donation to a homeless 
person (―GIVHMLSS‖), donation to a charity (―GIVCHRTY‖), and volunteer work for a 
charity (―VOLCHRTY‖). In all of these cases, we create dummy variables telling if the 
respondent practiced each prosocial behavior at least once in the past 12 months. We 
substitute sympathy variables for prosocial behavior variables in some regressions in 
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order to observe consistency in the effect of sympathy on income redistribution 
preferences and tax morale. 
Descriptive Statistics 
Table 22 provides the descriptive statistics of the GSS data without the use of any 
weight. The highest number of observations per variable is 5,577. In the selected piece of 
the survey, only socio-demographic questions such as gender, income, age, education, 
number of children, employment status, race, marital status, religion and region of 
residence, are asked to the entire set of respondents. Other variables have fewer 
respondents. For instance, some sympathy variables like the Davis empathic concern 
scale, ―PEOPTRBL‖ and ―SELFLESS‖ are asked to half of the samples of 2002 and 
2004, on average 2,650 observations. Financial satisfaction, confidence in the 
government, and preferences for income redistribution are asked to about thirty percent 
of the 2002 and 2004 respondents.  
The survey offers many weighting variables. We use ―WTSSALL,‖ which takes 
into consideration the sub-sampling of non-respondents and the number of adults in the 
household. This weight variable is used in all of our estimations. 
Sympathy by Groups 
One of our main objectives is to observe the effect of sympathy variables on 
income redistribution preferences. Table 23 gives an idea of how these sympathy 
variables differ across certain groups. The table shows the weighted average of the 
sympathy variables for all respondents, by age groups, by income levels, by social 
classes, and by gender.  
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With respect to the Davis Empathic Concern Scale (―DECS‖), which can vary 
from 1 to 28, we observe that the weighted average among all respondents is almost 21, 
which is a high score. The weighted average of ―PEOPTRBL‖ variable is almost 4 for all 
respondents; on average, a respondent would ―agree‖ with the statement that personally 
assisting people in trouble is important to him or her. Also, on average, all respondents 
seem to have a selfless caring for others most days.   
If we consider the age groups, the ―DECS‖ points tend to increase up to 21.5 
when a respondent’s age is between 45 and 55 years; after this point, older respondents 
have lower averages of ―DECS‖ points. Other sympathy variables have the same 
tendency. The averages of ―PEOPTRBL‖ and ―SELFLESS‖ variables rise up to the 
points of 4 and 2.9 when the age of the respondent is in the range 45-55 and 35-45 
respectively. After these maximum points, the averages of both variables fall. Although 
the difference in the averages of a specific sympathy variable across age groups may not 
be very large, they still indicate some tendency of higher values of sympathy for younger 
groups, mostly below the age of 55, and of lower values for older groups.  
In terms of income level, respondents in the lowest or second income quintile had 
lower ―DECS‖ point averages compared to higher income quintiles. This result is in 
accordance with the argument that richer individuals are likely to give more support for 
income redistribution if this approval depends on their sympathy. On the other hand, 
―PEOPTRBL‖ presents greater averages between the second and the fourth income 
quintiles. The respondents in the lowest and the highest income quintiles have the lowest 
averages of ―PEOPTRBL.‖ The averages of the other sympathy variable seem to 
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decrease as the income of respondents rises. Thus, with respect to income level, no 
unique pattern of the averages of the sympathy variables can be observed.  
When we consider difference in gender, we can observe that females seem to have 
higher averages of sympathy variables compared to males. The greater difference in 
averages is in ―SELFLESS‖ variable: females have an average 18 percent larger than 
males.   
Results 
It should be noted that there is a possible self-selection problem.  Individuals who 
have higher levels of sympathy may have intrinsic values or characteristics that are not 
easy to quantify and control for. These characteristics may be related to the support for 
income redistribution as well. Therefore, there may well be a self-selection problem in 
our analysis. However, due to the limitations of the dataset, we are unable to control for 
possible selection.  
Tables 3 and 4 show the results of regressing preferences for income 
redistribution on our sympathy measures without (Table 24) and with some control 
variables (Table 25). The control variables include U.S. region of residence, year dummy 
variable for 2004 and some standard socioeconomic factors such as race, income, 
education, gender, marital status, work status and age.  
In Tables 24 and 25, some sympathy variables are statistically significant (most at 
1 percent level) in explaining changes in income redistribution preferences. Two of them, 
―High DECS score group‖ and ―PEOPTRBL‖ are positively correlated with the 
preferences for income redistribution. If an individual has a high DECS score or gives 
importance to assisting people in trouble, her probability of being a supporter for income 
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redistribution increases by 20 percent. However, those who have given money to a 
charity in the past year are related to less support for income redistribution, or a reduction 
in the probability of being a supporter of 25 percent (only in Table 24, without control 
variables in the regression). This difference in the results from measures of attitude 
towards sympathy (―DECS‖ and ―PEOPTRBL‖) and actual behavior (―Giving to 
charity‖) may indicate that sympathy is at some extent related to income redistribution 
preferences; nevertheless, public provision of benefits to the poor is not a complement for 
private contributions. Alesina, Glaeser, and Sacerdote (2001) suggest that a smaller 
public provision of welfare in the U.S. (compared to Europe) does not represent less 
altruistic characteristics of the Americans since they are more likely to engage in private 
contributions (time and money donations) than Europeans. 
Other individual characteristics are also statistically significant. More educated 
people, higher family income, some religious denominations (Protestants and Catholics) 
and the confidence in the federal government are negatively related to income 
redistribution preferences. On the other hand, being a nonwhite individual is associated 
with more support for income redistribution. These are standard results from the previous 
literature on demand for income redistribution. An interesting result, which is different 
from previous literature, is the effect of age on income redistribution preferences. This 
effect is U-shaped in age, meaning that age has a negative effect on income redistribution 
preferences when the individual is younger while there is a positive relationship between 
these two variables when the individual is older. Being raised religiously, marital status 
and work status do not have a significant effect on the support for this type of policy. 
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Overall, it seems that those who are likely to receive more public welfare benefits 
such as the minorities and the elderly are associated with a higher support for income 
redistribution. In contrast, those who are less likely to depend on this type of benefits 
such as the more educated and the rich seem to be related to smaller support for income 
redistribution policy. This result may reflect that most Americans believe that poverty is 
caused by laziness and that providing public welfare benefits may discourage the poor to 
work their way out of poverty. 
Conclusion 
There are multiple factors that explain income redistribution preferences other 
than one’s level of income. This research focuses on one noneconomic factor that may 
affect this type of preference: sympathy. The definition of this term is the other-oriented 
feeling of compassion. In consequence, we can expect that those who have a concern for 
another person’s welfare if the other is in distress will support policies that can benefit 
the other, holding other variables constant. 
Considering that our analysis is limited due to self-selection issues, our results 
from the General Social Survey indicate that some sympathy measures (two measures of 
attitude towards sympathy: Davis Empathic Concern Scale and importance of personally 
assisting people in trouble) are positively related to preference for income redistribution. 
However, giving money to charity has an opposite effect. This difference in the effects of 
our measures of sympathy on income redistribution preferences suggests that public 
provision of welfare benefits is considered a substitute for private contributions. The 
previous literature suggests that Americans prefer to donate time and money privately, 
and increases in public provisions may reduce private donations.  
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These findings are helpful to policymakers since it indicates an important factor 
that influences the support for income redistribution: sympathy. We suggest that the 
government takes into consideration that, although sympathy appears to be related to 
higher support for income redistribution, there seems to be a trade-off between private 
donations and public provisions to the poor. This crowding out effect may have an impact 
on the society’s acceptability of a welfare reform for example. 
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Table 22 - Descriptive statistics, General Social Survey (2002 and 2004), Unweighted Data 
       
Variable 
Number of 
observations Mean
1
 
Standard 
Deviation Minimum Maximum Description 
  
     
  
High DECS score 
group 5,577 0.790 0.407 0 1 
Davis Empathic Concern Scale (DECS) 
score: 21-28 
PEOPTRBL dummy 2,691 0.760 0.427 0 1 
If R strongly agrees or agrees with the 
following statement: "Personally assisting 
people in trouble is very important to me" 
SELFLESS 2,632 2.747 1.433 0 5 
How often R feels a selfless caring for 
others in his/her daily life. 
REDISTR 1,765 4.280 1.962 1 7 Support for income redistribution. 
givblood 2,698 0.163 0.370 0 1 
If R donated blood at least once in the 
past 12 months 
givhmlss 2,687 0.639 0.480 0 1 
If R donated money to a homeless person 
at least once in the past 12 months 
volchrty 2,697 0.468 0.499 0 1 
If R worked as a volunteer for charity at 
least once in the past 12 months 
givchrty 2,692 0.785 0.411 0 1 
If R donated money to a charity at least 
once in the past 12 months 
Born 5,570 0.905 0.293 0 1 Born in the U.S. 
Female 5,577 0.550 0.498 0 1   
Age 5,554 46.122 17.086 18 89   
Educ 5,563 13.533 2.936 0 20 Highest year school completed 
Childs 5,568 1.817 1.652 0 8 Number of children 
Maeduc 4,827 11.628 3.493 0 20 
Highest year school completed by R's 
mother 
Realinc 4,945 35,933 35,853 294 135,416 Family real income (base 1986) 
ln(inc) 4,945 9.999 1.124 6 12 
Natural log of family real income (base 
1986) 
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Variable 
Number of 
observations Mean
1
 
Standard 
Deviation Minimum Maximum Description 
Nonwhite 5,577 0.207 0.405 0 1   
Full time 5,576 0.520 0.500 0 1  Employed full-time 
Part time 5,576 0.113 0.317 0 1  Employed part-time 
On leave 5,576 0.024 0.152 0 1  Temporary absent from work 
Unemployed 5,576 0.039 0.195 0 1   
Retired 5,576 0.147 0.354 0 1   
Student 5,576 0.035 0.183 0 1   
Homemaker 5,576 0.096 0.294 0 1   
Other work status 5,576 0.027 0.162 0 1   
Married 5,577 0.493 0.500 0 1   
Widowed 5,577 0.081 0.273 0 1   
Divorced 5,577 0.154 0.361 0 1   
Separated 5,577 0.034 0.182 0 1   
Single 5,577 0.238 0.426 0 1   
Protestant 5,546 0.531 0.499 0 1   
Catholic 5,546 0.240 0.427 0 1   
Jewish 5,546 0.019 0.135 0 1   
Other religions 5,546 0.070 0.255 0 1   
Atheist 5,546 0.141 0.348 0 1   
Raised religiously 5,545 0.924 0.265 0 1   
New  England 5,577 0.044 0.205 0 1   
Middle Atlantic 5,577 0.143 0.350 0 1   
East North Central 5,577 0.171 0.377 0 1   
West North Central 5,577 0.076 0.266 0 1   
South Atlantic 5,577 0.197 0.398 0 1   
East South Central 5,577 0.065 0.246 0 1   
West South Central 5,577 0.105 0.306 0 1   
120 
 
 
Variable 
Number of 
observations Mean
1
 
Standard 
Deviation Minimum Maximum Description 
Mountain 5,577 0.066 0.248 0 1   
Pacific 5,577 0.134 0.340 0 1   
Confed 1,753 0.241 0.428 0 1 Confidence in Federal Government 
Satfin 2,704 0.307 0.461 0 1 Financial satisfaction 
1
 The calculation of the means does not use weights. 
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Table 23 - Sympathy Variables, Weighted Data 
    
 
Sympathy Variables 
 
DECS                   
(from 1 to 28) PEOPTRBL SELFLESS  
All respondents 20.95 3.96 2.73 
    
 
  
By age group   
 
  
18 ≤ age < 25 19.83 3.88 2.62 
25 ≤ age < 35 20.48 3.95 2.73 
35 ≤ age < 45 20.95 3.96 2.85 
45 ≤ age < 55 21.52 4.03 2.70 
55 ≤ age < 65 21.48 3.99 2.71 
age ≥ 65 21.27 3.92 2.74 
    
 
  
By income level   
 
  
lowest income quintile 20.61 3.95 2.87 
second income quintile 20.46 3.97 2.80 
third income quintile 21.27 3.97 2.67 
fourth income quintile 21.03 3.97 2.65 
highest income quintile 21.16 3.95 2.73 
    
 
  
By gender   
 
  
female  22.2 4.02 2.95 
male 19.62 3.9 2.51 
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Table 24 - Probit analysis of being a supporter of income redistribution (Only sympathy variables in regressions) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Independent Variables 
Marginal 
Effects 
Marginal 
Effects 
Marginal 
Effects 
Marginal 
Effects 
Marginal 
Effects 
Marginal 
Effects 
Marginal 
Effects 
                
High DECS score group 0.208*** 
      
 
(0.068) 
      Important to assist 
people in trouble 
(PEOPTRBL dummy) 
 
0.194** 
     
  
(0.079) 
     SELFLESS 
  
0.039 
    
   
(0.024) 
    Blood Donor 
   
-0.050 
   
    
(0.090) 
   Giving to Homeless 
    
0.090 
  
     
(0.071) 
  Volunteer 
     
-0.030 
 
      
(0.067) 
 Giving to Charity 
      
-0.257*** 
       
(0.082) 
        Observations 1,765 1,756 1,718 1,759 1,754 1,760 1,755 
Log Likelihood -1,202 -1,199 -1,175 -1,205 -1,201 -1,205 -1,196 
LR χ2 9.392 6.108 2.674 0.312 1.628 0.197 9.737 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 25 - Probit analysis of being a supporter of income redistribution (with control variables) 
  (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) 
Independent Variables 
Marginal 
Effects 
Marginal 
Effects 
Marginal 
Effects 
Marginal 
Effects 
Marginal 
Effects 
Marginal 
Effects 
Marginal 
Effects 
High DECS score group 0.254*** 
      
 
(0.079) 
      Important to assist people in trouble 
(PEOPTRBL dummy) 
 
0.224** 
     
  
(0.092) 
     SELFLESS 
  
0.048 
    
   
(0.029) 
    Blood Donor 
   
0.018 
   
    
(0.101) 
   Giving to Homeless 
    
0.118 
  
     
(0.082) 
  Volunteer 
     
0.094 
 
      
(0.080) 
 Giving to Charity 
      
0.046 
       
(0.109) 
Age of respondent -0.038** -0.037** -0.036** -0.038** -0.036** -0.037** -0.038** 
 
(0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) 
Age squared / 100 0.038** 0.037** 0.036** 0.038** 0.036** 0.037** 0.038** 
 
(0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) 
Highest year of school completed -0.027* -0.024 -0.024 -0.025 -0.026* -0.028* -0.026* 
 
(0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) 
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ln(family real income) -0.158*** -0.159*** -0.159*** -0.160*** -0.166*** -0.161*** -0.162*** 
 
(0.046) (0.046) (0.046) (0.046) (0.047) (0.046) (0.047) 
Nonwhite 0.298*** 0.304*** 0.296*** 0.303*** 0.282*** 0.301*** 0.307*** 
 
(0.108) (0.108) (0.109) (0.108) (0.109) (0.108) (0.108) 
Unemployed 0.018 0.014 -0.038 -0.004 -0.014 0.012 -0.006 
 
(0.202) (0.203) (0.207) (0.202) (0.203) (0.202) (0.202) 
Married 0.163 0.150 0.172 0.160 0.167 0.158 0.160 
 
(0.124) (0.124) (0.125) (0.124) (0.124) (0.124) (0.124) 
Protestant -0.317** -0.310** -0.303** -0.301** -0.299** -0.308** -0.301** 
 
(0.123) (0.123) (0.123) (0.122) (0.122) (0.122) (0.122) 
Catholic -0.223* -0.206 -0.208 -0.205 -0.210 -0.209 -0.204 
 
(0.133) (0.133) (0.134) (0.132) (0.132) (0.132) (0.132) 
Raised religiously 0.103 0.119 0.059 0.128 0.120 0.116 0.125 
 
(0.165) (0.165) (0.163) (0.164) (0.163) (0.164) (0.164) 
Year 2004 -0.100 -0.106 -0.154* -0.099 -0.098 -0.099 -0.098 
 
(0.078) (0.078) (0.083) (0.078) (0.078) (0.078) (0.078) 
Confidence in Federal Govt. -0.381*** -0.368*** -0.399*** -0.366*** -0.370*** -0.364*** -0.369*** 
 
(0.093) (0.093) (0.094) (0.093) (0.093) (0.093) (0.093) 
Financial satisfaction -0.117 -0.120 -0.108 -0.120 -0.120 -0.123 -0.118 
 (0.086) (0.086) (0.087) (0.086) (0.086) (0.086) (0.086) 
Observations 1,386 1,384 1,361 1,383 1,381 1,384 1,383 
Log Likelihood -868.1 -868.6 -852.0 -871.7 -869.4 -871.2 -871.7 
LR χ2 140.8 139.3 142.0 133.2 134.0 134.5 133.5 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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CONCLUSION 
Economics is recognizing to a greater extent the influence of morality on an 
individual’s decisions. The purpose of this dissertation is to identify this effect on 
different types of decisions: tax compliance, charitable donations and support for income 
redistribution. Although examining morality is a complex issue, we narrow our analysis 
to three factors related to morality: empathy, sympathy, and religious education. 
―Empathy‖ is an affective state of ―putting yourself in someone else’s shoes,‖ identifying 
what the other person is feeling and responding to it. ―Sympathy‖ is considered an 
emotional response of concern for another’s wellbeing caused by the other’s emotional 
state, a response that is not identical to the other’s emotion. These two moral emotions, 
empathy and sympathy, are likely to encourage moral behavior according to psychology 
literature (Eisenberg, 2000; Hoffman, 1998). Moreover, religious education may play a 
role in developing these moral emotions and moral character despite the religious beliefs 
held.  
In the first chapter, we analyze how sympathy and empathy affect tax compliance 
decisions. Using experimental methods, we are able to identify sympathy by the subjects’ 
responses to the Davis Empathic Concern Scale and to the questions about frequency of 
prosocial behaviors in the past 12 months. In addition, we promote empathy with a 
priming activity in which subjects read a few statements of the Golden Rule and write its 
definition in their own words. Then, the subjects face a series of one-shot tax compliance 
decisions presented at once and with no immediate feedback. According to our results, 
most of our sympathy measures have a positive and small effect on tax compliance. 
Nevertheless, in our experiment, promoting empathy does have a statistically significant 
impact overall. Only under some circumstances (e.g., if the individual is not Protestant, 
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not a volunteer, or belongs to the group of donors who have given money to the homeless 
in the past year), priming empathy is related to more compliance. These results suggest 
that, in spite of the relatively small effects of sympathy and priming empathy on tax 
compliance, the development of these moral emotions may be beneficial since they are 
likely to reduce evasion.       
Based on the assumption that religious teachings can provide moral education to 
children and help develop their moral character regardless of religious beliefs they may 
hold, the second chapter investigates the effect of religious education on charitable 
donations in adulthood. Using the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID), we find that 
attending religious schools is positively related to donations to secular and religious 
organizations. Another finding is that attending Catholic schools is more likely to 
increase secular donations, whereas attending other religious schools tends to raise 
donations to religious institutions. According to our results, individuals with religious 
education are more sensitive to the price of giving, thus changing income tax policy may 
affect their giving behavior at a greater extent. An important issue in our analysis is the 
possible presence of selection bias. We acknowledge, however, this possibility and the 
fact that we are not able to control for this problem due to the limitations of the publicly 
available PSID dataset.    
The third chapter examines whether individuals with higher levels of sympathy are 
more likely to support income redistribution since the poor may benefit from this type of 
policy. Some of the measures of sympathy are similar to those used in the first chapter: 
the Davis Empathic Concern Scale, and the frequency of prosocial behaviors performed 
in the past year. Other measures are: the importance that they give to personally assisting 
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someone in need, and the frequency with which they feel a selfless caring for others. 
Using the General Social Survey, we investigate the relationship between each sympathy 
measure and the support for income redistribution. We find that some measures of 
sympathy have a positive effect on support for redistribution. Nonetheless, there may be a 
problem of self-selection in our analysis (since there could be personal characteristics that 
are related to both more sympathy and more support for income redistribution), and we 
are not able to correct this problem due to limitations of the dataset and the complexity of 
the issue. Since our analysis is restricted, we are not able to identify the degree of 
importance of sympathy in the analysis of income redistribution preferences.  
In conclusion, sympathy seems to affect individual behavior at a small extent. On 
the other hand, there is inconsistency on the sign of this effect on tax compliance and 
income redistribution preferences. Therefore, some measures of sympathy used in this 
research may not be appropriate proxies for this moral emotion; however, it is difficult to 
determine which ones are the most suitable. In addition, our method of eliciting empathy 
either does not affect taxpayers’ attitudes, or this effect on attitudes is too small. Thus, we 
are not able to argue that empathy affects individual behavior. Although we find that 
attending religious schools is related to more money and time donations, we are not able 
to separate this effect from others due to our inability to address the potential selection 
issue. Overall, despite the sometimes weak results of this research caused by the 
limitations of the available data and the complexity of the issues studied, the development 
of these moral emotions may generate benefits to society.      
In order to better understand how choices are made, it is important to take into 
account intrinsic factors such as ―morality‖ and ―emotions‖ and how they affect 
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individuals’ decisions. For future work, we give a few suggestions on this direction. First, 
on the selection-bias issue, more complete datasets may offer acceptable instruments for 
the analysis of morality or religiosity issues. However, it is important to consider the 
difficulty of separating morality from other religious aspects. Second, it would be 
interesting to analyze other types of priming methods to elicit emotions on subjects. The 
use of photographs or videos may be good alternatives for the religious statements of the 
Golden Rule used in this research and more effective in changing individuals’ attitudes.            
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APPENDIX A 
Instructions of sessions S1 and S3 
Session S1: 
GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS 
 
This is an experiment in decision making under uncertainty. You will receive $5 for your 
participation. You may earn an additional amount of money determined by your choice 
and by the choice of other participants. All your earnings will be paid to you in cash at 
the end of the experiment.  
 
Please follow the instructions carefully.  
 
No Talking Allowed  
You will not be permitted to speak with anyone during the experiment.  
 
Complete Privacy  
You will never be asked to reveal your identity to anyone during the experiment. Each 
participant will receive a key with a unique number. This will be your identification 
number that only you will know. Furthermore, you will be able to collect your earnings 
with privacy in an adjacent room where you can find a mailbox with your identification 
number that only your key can open. 
 
A monitor 
One of the persons in this room will be chosen to be the monitor for this experiment. The 
monitor will be paid $25 in addition to the participation fee of $5. He or she will verify 
that the instructions have been followed as they appear here.    
 
Structure of the experiment 
This experiment is divided into three parts. At the end of the experiment, you will be 
asked to answer a questionnaire.  
 
How are earnings determined? 
You will be asked to make 8independent decisions in the 3 independent parts. They are 
independent because, from one decision to another, your balance will NOT be carried 
over.  
 
We will calculate your earnings as follows: 
 
After all decision sheets have been collected, we will check if everyone has completed all 
decisions. Then we will draw a ball numbered from 1 to 8 from a cage. The number of 
the ball drawn will determine which one of your decisions will be your final earnings. 
Only this decision chosen randomly will count towards your earnings. For instance, if we 
draw the ball with the number 1, you will be paid for ―Decision # 1‖ or your first 
decision.  
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Please keep in mind that we numbered the decisions continuously from one part to the 
other. 
 
In one part of the experiment, you will be assigned to a group of 4. If the decision chosen 
to be the final earnings belongs to this part, we will randomly assign you to a group of 4. 
We will do this by drawing numbered balls containing the identifying numbers of all 
subjects in the room. We will draw 4 balls. The subjects whose indentifying numbers 
correspond to these four draws will be in one group. This would be repeated until all 
subjects are assigned to a group.  
 
Again, you will only be paid for the decision randomly chosen. If the decision involves a 
group of 4, you will be paid based on the decisions you and the others in your group 
make for that decision.  
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PART I – INSTRUCTIONS 
This part consists of only one decision task. In this task, you will allocate $10 between 
yourself and a charity of your choice.  
 
If this is the decision randomly chosen to be the final earnings in the experiment, the 
experimenter will calculate the total donations to the charities. We will make online 
donations of these amounts to the respective charities. The monitor will validate these 
transactions. 
 
a. Even if you are NOT sending money, please select a charity of your choice because 
this information will be used in another part of the experiment. Pick one and only 
one of the following charities or write in a charity at the bottom: 
 
 American Red Cross 
Offers blood donation information and services, disaster relief, many helpful 
educational classes, as well as HIV/AIDS support groups. 
 Big Brothers Big Sisters of America 
Provides one-to-one mentoring for youth and children residing in a one parent family 
for the purpose of creating caring, confident and competent young adults. 
 American Cancer Society 
Provides many services to cancer patients and their families such as information, 
medical equipment, transportation to treatment locations, and a support system. 
 Doctors without Borders 
Doctors and nurses volunteer to provide urgent medical care in some 70 countries to 
civilian victims of war and disaster regardless of race, religion or politics 
 Feed The Children 
Provides food, clothing, medical care, education and emergency relief to children in 
the United States and overseas. 
 UNICEF 
Works for children's rights, their survival, development and protection. 
 Salvation Army 
Performs social and charitable work, and helps provide disaster relief. 
 Humane Society of the United States 
Is a disaster relief agency for animals: provides direct care for thousands of animals 
at rescue facilities, wildlife rehabilitation centers, and mobile veterinary clinics 
 American Diabetes Association 
Provides many services people with diabetes and their families, funds research on 
diabetes, fights for the rights of people with diabetes. 
  
Other:_______________________________________________________________ 
(The organization must limit its purposes to being charitable, and permanently have 
its assets committed to charitable purposes and to public benefit. In order words, it 
must have 501(c)(3)status as defined by the Internal Revenue Service.) 
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b. Choose how to allocate the $10 between yourself and the charity of your choice. 
 
Decision # 1. Keep ______ and send ______ to the charity of my choice.   
(The sum of the allocations must be equal to $10)  
133 
 
 
 PART II – INSTRUCTIONS 
 
Now, you will make a series of choices in a tax setting. In this part, you have an income 
of $10. You are expected to pay tax on your income. Your task will be to decide how 
much of your income to report to the Tax Authority in different scenarios.  
 
A Group 
You will be randomly assigned to a group of 4 (you plus 3 others). 
 
The Income 
Each member of your group including yourself will receive an income of $10.  
 
The Tax 
The tax rate is 30% for all participants. Thus, if you declare X, you will pay 30% of X 
and your after-tax income is $10 minus 30% of X.  
 
The Audit 
A specific number of red balls and white balls will be placed in a box. These numbers 
may vary from one decision to another. If a red ball is drawn, then everyone will be 
audited. If a white ball is drawn, then no one will be audited.  
 
The Penalty 
If you are audited, then any amount of income that you did not report in that period will 
be detected. Then, you will pay tax on the non reported income plus a penalty 
proportional to that amount. 
 
The Public Fund 
In some decisions, there may be a public fund. If there is a public fund, after all tax and 
penalty payments are made, the total amount of taxes originally collected from your 
group will be summed up and doubled (the ―public fund‖ of your group). Note that this 
amount does NOT include additional payments resulting from the failure to comply with 
the tax if you are audited. 
 
The public fund will be divided equally among all members of your group. However, in a 
few decisions, a portion of the public fund may go to charity (i.e., divided equally among 
the institutions chosen in Part I by the members of your group) and the other portion 
returns to your group.  
 
YOUR DECISION FOR THIS PART: 
Decide how much income you want to declare to the Tax Authority for each scenario. 
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Examples of choices you will make in this experiment (You will receive $2 for 
completing this task.) 
 
Each decision you will make is similar to the following examples. To assist you, we 
provide an Excel workbook that already contains all calculations.  Each example is in one 
worksheet. In order to be sure that you understand how your earnings will be calculated, 
you are asked to fill out the blanks. Be sure you are on the right spreadsheet when 
completing this task. 
 
Your only decision is to choose the amount of income you want to declare to the Tax 
Authority. In column C of all spreadsheets, you have in intervals of $0.25 the options of 
income you can declare. Pick one number and find the values of interest (such as final 
income without an audit) by being in the same row and moving to the other columns.  
 
For instance, in example 1, if I decide to declare $8.25, my tax payment will be $2.48 and 
my final income may be $7.53 if there is no audit and $5.95 if an audit occurs. 
 
In example 2, you will be asked to enter an estimate of how much you think another 
member of your group would declare. This is only to illustrate how your earnings are 
calculated. During the actual experiment, everyone will make their own decisions. 
 
 
In examples 1 and 2: 
 
 You are in a group of 4;  
 Each member has an income of $10; 
 Each member faces a tax rate of 30%; 
 Public fund = 2 x (total tax payments 
originally collected from your group); 
 If audited, you  will have to pay both: 
1. A tax (30% of non reported income); 
2. A penalty (2 times 30% of non 
reported income). 
 
 
 
Example 1 (Go to Worksheet “Example 1”):  
 
a. Amount of income you want to declare to the Tax Authority 
(Column C) 
 
b. Tax payment     (Column D)  
 
If you are NOT audited: 
 
c. Final income     (Column F)  
 
If you ARE audited: 
 
c'. Total of taxes and penalty to be paid     (Column K)  
d'. Final income     (Column L)  
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Example 2 (Go to Worksheet “Example 2”): 
Now, there is a public fund that will be fully returned to your group.  
 
a. Amount of income you want to declare to the Tax Authority 
(Column C) 
 
b. Tax payment     (Column D)  
c. Your share of the public fund     (Column G)        
 
If you are NOT audited: 
 
d. Final income     (Column I)  
 
If you ARE audited: 
 
d'. Total of taxes and penalty to be paid     (Column N)  
e'. Final income     (Column O)  
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PART II – DECISION SHEET 
Please fill out the blanks for each decision below. Remember: 
 You are in a group of 4;  If a red ball is drawn, everybody will be audited. 
 Each member of your group has an income of $10; 
 Each member faces a tax rate of 30%; 
 Public fund = 2 x (total tax payments originally collected 
from your group); 
 If audited, you  will have to pay both: 
1. A tax (30% of non reported income); 
2. A penalty. 
 
Audit rate Penalty rate Public fund 
Amount of income you 
want to declare to the 
Tax Authority 
 
(Fill out this column) 
Decision # 2 
30 % 
(3 red + 7 white balls) 
2 times 30% of 
non reported income 
No  
Decision # 3 
30 % 
(3 red + 7 white balls) 
2 times 30% of 
non reported income 
Fully returned 
(you get 1/4 of the public fund) 
 
Decision # 4 
50 % 
(5 red + 5 white balls) 
2 times 30% of 
non reported income 
Fully returned 
(you get 1/4 of the public fund) 
 
Decision # 5 
10 % 
(1 red + 9 white balls) 
2 times 30% of 
non reported income 
Fully returned 
(you get 1/4 of the public fund) 
 
Decision # 6 
30 % 
(3 red + 7 white balls) 
4 times 30% of 
non reported income 
Fully returned 
(you get 1/4 of the public fund) 
 
Decision # 7 
30 % 
(3 red + 7 white balls) 
2 times 30% of 
non reported income 
Partially returned: 
50% goes to the charities chosen by 
your group in part I; 
50% returns to your group. 
(you get 1/8 of the public fund) 
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PART III – INSTRUCTIONS  
 
This part consists of only one decision task. In this task, you will allocate $10 between 
yourself and the Georgia State University (either the Georgia State University Foundation 
or any division of GSU given below). 
 
If this is the decision randomly chosen to be the final earnings in the experiment, the 
experimenter will calculate contributions to each GSU division. We will make online 
contributions of these amounts to their respective divisions. The monitor will validate 
these transactions and sign a form verifying that the experiment was conducted according 
to these instructions. 
 
a. If you would like to send some money to the Georgia State University Foundation or 
any GSU division, please choose an option below. Pick one and only one of the 
following divisions: 
 
 Georgia State University Fund 
 Andrew Young School of Policy Studies 
 College of Arts and Sciences 
 College of Education 
 College of Health and Human Sciences 
 College of Law  
 J. Mack Robinson College of Business 
 Athletics – Panther Club 
 Georgia State University Library 
 Other:______________________________________  
(we will give a list of other possible options) 
 None 
 
b. Choose how to allocate the $10 between yourself and the GSU division of your 
choice. 
 
Decision # 8. Keep ______ and send ______ to the division of my choice.  
(The sum of the allocations must be equal to $10)  
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PERSONAL RECORD SHEET 
 
PART I Decision #1 
 
Kept: Sent: 
PART II Decision #2 
 
Reported  
Income: 
 
Decision #3 
 
Reported 
 Income: 
 
Decision #4 
 
Reported 
 Income: 
 
Decision #5 
 
Reported 
 Income: 
 
Decision #6 
 
Reported 
 Income: 
 
Decision #7 
 
Reported 
 Income: 
 
PART III Decision # 8 
 
Kept: Sent: 
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QUESTIONNAIRE 
Thank you for participating in this experiment. Please answer the following questions 
about the experiment and you. We will pay you $8 for the completion of the 
questionnaire. 
 
Information about the experiment: 
 
1. Have you participated in other Economics experiments? 
_____ Yes       ______ No 
 
 If “Yes”, approximately how many other experiments have you been in? ______ 
 
2.  Were instructions for this experiment clear?   _____ Yes       ______ No 
 
3. During part II, in which you had to determine the amount of income you wanted to 
report to a Tax Authority, was it difficult to keep track of all the numbers involved?   
_____ Yes       ______ No 
 
 
General information: 
 
1. Please tell me for the following statement whether you think it can always be justified, 
never be justified, or something in between.  
 
Cheating on taxes if 
you have a chance 
1 
Never 
justifiable 
2 3 4 
5 
Always 
justifiable 
 
2. Thinking about your reasons for paying taxes, please indicate how important each of 
the reasons below has been in your case: 
 
A sense of duty or 
moral obligation 
1 
Not at all  
important 
2 3 4 
5 
Very 
important 
How tax payments 
are used by the 
government 
1 
Not at all 
important 
2 3 4 
5 
Very 
important 
Concern about 
penalties if caught 
cheating on taxes 
1 
Not at all 
important 
2 3 4 
5 
Very 
important 
      
Other reason:      
 1 
Not at all 
important 
2 3 4 
5 
Very 
important 
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Information about you: 
 
1. What year are you at school?  
____ Freshman    ____ Sophomore    ____Junior   ____ Senior   ____ Graduate 
 
2. What is your intended or declared major?  
____________________________________ 
 
3. What is your age?  ____________________ 
 
4. What is your gender? 
____ Female    ____ Male     
 
5. What is your race? 
 ____ White    ____ Black    ____ Asian   ____ Hispanic    ____ Other     
 
6. Where were you born? 
____ U.S.A.    ____ Other   (Please specify: 
_____________________________________ ) 
 
7. What is your religion? (Please check the one that you feel best represents your beliefs 
or religion) 
 
 Christian (Which denomination? _____________________ ) 
 Jewish 
 Muslim 
 Buddhist 
 Hindu 
 Other (Please specify: _____________________________________ ) 
 I don’t follow any specific religion, but I do have spiritual beliefs (for example, 
you believe there is some other power or force outside yourself which might 
influence your life). 
 None 
 Prefer not to respond 
 
8. About how often, if ever, have you attended religious services in the last year? 
 
 Once a week or more 
 Two or three times a month 
 Once a month 
 A few times a year or less 
 Never 
 Not applicable 
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9.  Which, if any, of the following do you believe in?  
 
 
God 
       Yes           No        Prefer not to 
respond 
Life after death 
       Yes           No           Prefer not to 
 respond 
      Free will   OR          Predestination          Prefer not to 
respond 
Heaven / Hell 
       Yes           No           Prefer not to 
 respond 
Reincarnation 
       Yes           No           Prefer not to 
 respond 
Judgment of soul after death 
       Yes           No           Prefer not to 
 respond 
If we sow goodness, we will reap goodness; 
if we sow evil, we will reap evil.  
       Yes           No           Prefer not to 
 respond 
 
 
10. Please indicate the degree to which the following statements describe you: 
 
 
 
Does 
NOT 
describ
e me 
well 
1 
2 3 4 
Descri
bes me 
very 
well 
5 
I often have tender, concerned 
feelings for people less fortunate 
than me. 
     
Sometimes I don’t feel very sorry for 
other people when they are having 
problems. 
     
When I see someone being taken 
advantage of, I feel kind of 
protective towards them. 
     
Other people’s misfortunes do not 
usually disturb me a great deal. 
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11. During the past 12 months, how often have you done each of the following:  
 
a. Donated blood 
 
 More than 3 times in the past year 
 At least 2 or 3 times in the past year 
 Once in the past year 
 Not at all in the past year 
 Don’t know 
 Prefer not to respond 
 
c. Done volunteer work 
 
 More than 3 times in the past year 
 At least 2 or 3 times in the past year 
 Once in the past year 
 Not at all in the past year 
 Don’t know 
 Prefer not to respond 
 
b. Given food or money to a homeless 
person 
 
 More than 3 times in the past year 
 At least 2 or 3 times in the past year 
 Once in the past year 
 Not at all in the past year 
 Don’t know 
 Prefer not to respond 
 
d. Given money to a charity 
 
 More than 3 times in the past year 
 At least 2 or 3 times in the past year 
 Once in the past year 
 Not at all in the past year 
 Don’t know 
 Prefer not to respond 
 
 
If you have comments or suggestions about this experiment, please use this space.  
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________ 
THANK YOU FOR PARTICIPATING! 
  
When I see someone being treated 
unfairly, I sometimes don’t feel very 
much pity for them. 
     
I am often quite touched by things 
that I see happen. 
     
I would describe myself as a pretty 
soft-hearted person. 
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Session S3: (Only sections which are different from instructions of Session S1) 
 
GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS 
 
This is an experiment in decision making under uncertainty. You will receive $5 for your 
participation. You may earn an additional amount of money determined by your choice 
and by the choice of other participants. All your earnings will be paid to you in cash at 
the end of the experiment.  
 
Please follow the instructions carefully.  
 
No Talking Allowed  
You will not be permitted to speak with anyone during the experiment.  
 
Complete Privacy  
You will never be asked to reveal your identity to anyone during the experiment. Each 
participant will receive a key with a unique number. This will be your identification 
number that only you will know. Furthermore, you will be able to collect your earnings 
with privacy in an adjacent room where you can find a mailbox with your identification 
number that only your key can open. 
 
A monitor 
One of the persons in this room will be chosen to be the monitor for this experiment. The 
monitor will be paid $25 in addition to the participation fee of $5. He or she will verify 
that the instructions have been followed as they appear here.    
 
Structure of the experiment 
This experiment is divided into two parts. At the end of the experiment, you will be asked 
to answer a questionnaire.  
 
We will first distribute the rules for part I. The instructions for the next part will be 
distributed later.  
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PART I – INSTRUCTIONS 
This part consists of only one decision task. We ask you to read the following statements 
and answer a question. You will receive $5 for completing this task. 
________________________________________________________________________ 
―Treat not others in ways that you yourself would find hurtful.‖ 
The Buddha, Udana-Varga 5.18 
 
―In everything, do to others as you would have them do to you; for this is the law and the 
prophets.‖ 
Jesus, Matthew 7:12 
 
―One word which sums up the basis of all good conduct: loving-kindness. Do not do to 
others what you do not want done to yourself.‖ 
Confucius, Analects 15.23 
 
―This is the sum of duty: do not do to others what would cause pain if done to you.‖ 
Mahabharata 5:1517 
 
―Not one of you truly believes until you wish for others what you wish for yourself.‖ 
The Prophet Muhammad, Hadith 
 
―What is hateful to you, do not do to your neighbour. This is the whole Torah; all the rest 
is commentary. Go and learn it.‖ 
Hillel, Talmud, Shabbath 31a 
 
These are 6 written versions of the Golden Rule. How would you express the Golden 
Rule in your own words? 
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________ 
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This question was included in the questionnaire in Session S3 and Session S4: 
12. For decision #6, please select a charity of your choice. Pick one and only one of the 
following charities or write in a charity at the bottom: 
 American Red Cross 
Offers blood donation information and services, disaster relief, many helpful 
educational classes, as well as HIV/AIDS support groups. 
 Big Brothers Big Sisters of America 
Provides one-to-one mentoring for youth and children residing in a one parent family 
for the purpose of creating caring, confident and competent young adults. 
 American Cancer Society 
Provides many services to cancer patients and their families such as information, 
medical equipment, transportation to treatment locations, and a support system. 
 Doctors without Borders 
Doctors and nurses volunteer to provide urgent medical care in some 70 countries to 
civilian victims of war and disaster regardless of race, religion or politics 
 Feed The Children 
Provides food, clothing, medical care, education and emergency relief to children in 
the United States and overseas. 
 UNICEF 
Works for children's rights, their survival, development and protection. 
 Salvation Army 
Performs social and charitable work, and helps provide disaster relief. 
 Humane Society of the United States 
Is a disaster relief agency for animals: provides direct care for thousands of animals 
at rescue facilities, wildlife rehabilitation centers, and mobile veterinary clinics 
 
Other:_______________________________________________________________ 
(The organization must limit its purposes to being charitable, and permanently have 
its assets committed to charitable purposes and to public benefit. In order words, it 
must have 501(c)(3)status as defined by the Internal Revenue Service.) 
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APPENDIX B 
Wording of questions from the General Social Survey used in the Essay 3. 
a. EQWLTH: 
―Some people think that the government in Washington ought to reduce the income 
differences between the rich and the poor, perhaps by raising the taxes of wealthy 
families or by giving income assistance to the poor. Others think that the government 
should not concern itself with reducing this income difference between the rich and the 
poor. Think of a score of 1 as meaning that the government ought to reduce the income 
differences between rich and poor, and a score of 7 meaning that the government should 
not concern itself with reducing income differences. What score between 1 and 7 comes 
closest to the way you feel?‖ 
b. Davis Empathic Concern Scale: 
 
1. I often have tender, concerned feelings for people less fortunate than me. 
2. Sometimes I don't feel very sorry for other people when they are having problems. 
(Reversed) 
3. When I see someone being taken advantage of, I feel kind of protective towards them. 
4. Other people's misfortunes do not usually disturb me a great deal. (Reversed) 
5. When I see someone being treated unfairly, I sometimes don't feel very much pity for 
them. (Reversed) 
6. I am often quite touched by things that I see happen. 
7. I would describe myself as a pretty soft-hearted person.  
 
c. PEOPTRBL: 
―Please tell me whether you strongly agree, agree, neither agree nor disagree, 
disagree, or strongly disagree with the following statement: 
- Personally assisting people in trouble is very important to me‖ 
 
d. SELFLESS: 
―The following are things that you may experience in your daily life. Please tell me 
how often these occur. 
-  I feel a selfless caring for others.‖ 
 
e. Prosocial behaviors: 
―During the past 12 months, how often have you done each of the following things: 
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- Donated blood. (GIVBLOOD) 
- Given food or money to a homeless person. (GIVHMLSS) 
- Done volunteer work for a charity. (VOLCHRTY) 
- Given money to a charity. (GIVCHRTY)‖ 
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